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1 Introduction 
Some of the inspiration for this thesis comes from an article in the student newspaper in 
Trondheim, Under Dusken (Grøttum 2005), and similar comments over the following years. 
Political science professor Anders Todal Jenssen insisted that the student democracy in 
Trondheim lacked legitimacy because of the low voter turnout and that the introduction of 
political parties would be the solution to this problem. Binding platforms would make student 
politicians accountable to the voters and increase support for democracy. As a student 
representative myself at the time, I was provoked. We were proud of the lack of polarization 
within the student democracy and, although I didn’t know the term at the time, the level of 
deliberation. This started me on the quest for an alternative to Professor Todal Jenssen’s strong 
belief in the necessity of political parties. 
Democracy does of course seem unthinkable without political parties. Almost every 
democracy is dominated by a system of organized factions that structure, educate and drive the 
political process forwards. The necessity for such a system is no longer seriously questioned in 
political science. 
I don’t believe, however, that any institution should be beyond question. Even if we have no 
intention to get rid of political parties, we should strive to understand the effect they have on 
democracy. As I will show in this thesis, one such effect may be reducing open and free 
deliberation among decision-makers. This may be a cost we are willing to pay, but not a cost we 
should pay without knowing its size.  
Deliberation should not be considered merely as a normative ideal for democracy, but also a 
descriptive model for understanding the workings of democracy. The amount and quality of 
deliberation may explain political decisions and outcomes that aggregative models do not. This 
should make deliberation a topic of interest even if one does not accept its normative 
justification. This is covered in chapter 2. 
Institutions influence the way democracy works. If deliberation is an important characteristic 
of democracy, we should take interest in how institutional design affects deliberation. There has 
been some research on this, but political parties, integral to almost all modern democracies, seem 
to have been neglected in this respect. I will show that there are sufficient theoretical reservations 
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about their effect on deliberation that this should be a topic of proper empirical testing. This is 
discussed in chapter 3. 
To test the relationship between political parties and deliberation empirically, we need an 
approach for measuring deliberation. We should have a method with a theoretically sound basis, 
that measures what we want it to, and that is acceptable within the wider sphere of political 
science (a discipline that is both theoretically and empirically oriented). I will examine various 
proposals for examining the amount and quality of deliberation and consider their respective 
strengths and weaknesses. This is the topic of chapter 4. 
The Discourse Quality Index seems to be the most promising such method in use today. I 
have tested the utility of the method for addressing whether political parties weaken deliberation 
in a political system. To do this I applied the method to two democratic bodies: the student 
parliaments of the universities in Trondheim and Oslo, Norway. Due to a limited amount of data 
I did not get significant results concerning the question itself, but I have collected practical 
experiences and new insight into the method and its applicability. This is covered in chapter 5. 
Quickly summarized, I find in this thesis that there seems to be sufficient theoretical grounds 
to support the assumption that political party systems are detrimental to deliberation. A major 
obstacle to empirical testing of this and other theories about deliberation is found in the current 
state of empirical methods. Several methods have been tried, but none seem to be able to 
completely combine the demands needed for the conclusions to gain general acceptance. The 
Discourse Quality Index seems to be the most sophisticated and promising of such methods, but 
there are still a number of problems that should be addressed. 
1.1 Research objective 
The central research question for the thesis is whether political parties weaken deliberation 
in democratic bodies. By this I mean that political parties have certain tendencies that serve to 
reduce the level of deliberation within the political system. In many cases these are the very 
mechanisms that make political parties an effective way of organizing large scale democracy and 
making it work. 
It is important to emphasize that this does not mean that I claim democracy would be better 
without political parties. In fact, history seems to show us that it is unlikely that democracy can 
survive at all beyond a very small scale without political parties to structure the process. 
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Nevertheless, it is important to know what side effects this has on democracy itself, in this case 
through changing the climate for deliberation. 
What this does mean is that we expect that a working democracy with political parties tends 
to have less deliberation than a democracy without. The latter is not an entirely theoretical 
construction. Such democracies exist, although not in a larger scale. National government is the 
main area of interest for political science, and the question may thus seem irrelevant. However, if 
we can prove that this effect exists, we can in turn move on to consider different party systems to 
find possible compromises between party rule and deliberative decision making.  
Within these pages, I will limit myself to outlaying the theoretical basis for the thesis and 
examining the ways in which it may be tested. 
1.2 Theoretical and ideological background 
In my opinion, any good academic should be open about the theoretical and ideological 
origins of his work. In so doing, an academic will put the reader in a position to make his own 
judgement as to the extent this has influenced the academic work. 
I believe in deliberation. I believe in open and free dialogue and that this is beneficial to 
political decision making as well as most other areas of society. Although shared by many great 
thinkers, this is a belief based as much upon my own experiences and what I consider common 
sense as it is on the convincing nature of the theoretical arguments. I am, however, aware that all, 
or even most, political scientists do not share this strong belief. I will therefore try not to take 
such a belief for granted or as a necessary basis for this paper. I will focus on why deliberation 
should be of interest regardless of whether or not one believes it is the way to revitalize 
democracy.   
I will also admit that I come into this process with a considerable prejudice against the role of 
political parties in democracy, particularly as manifested in the current political system in 
Norway. I have a background as an active participant in the political process myself, and this 
thesis is in many ways the result of a growing frustration with the role of political parties. This 
frustration caused me to withdraw from an active role within politics and caused an interest in 
studying parties as a phenomenon. 
Although this theory does not draw explicitly on institutionalist theory, it is in many ways 
informed by it. An underlying assumption that is not discussed much further is that the shape and 
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nature of political institutions affects behaviour. In this particular instance that is recognizable in 
the theory that the institutionalization of political factions into parties affects the deliberative 
behaviour of political actors. 
A last and important part of the foundation for this work is a holistic approach to political 
science. There seems to be much emphasis, particularly in America, on emphasizing divisions 
and making exclusive categories in the human and social sciences. Political science is something 
distinct from political theory, philosophy, sociology, language theory and so forth. I believe that 
although these labels occasionally have their use, social science will be stronger, better and more 
useful if it can draw upon a broader theoretical and methodical basis, without excluding on the 
basis of disciplinary origin. I therefore draw on theory from several fields in this thesis, not 
putting much effort into making the distinction about what belongs under which label. 
2 Deliberation and theory 
I will now try to outline two different perspectives on democracy that form much of the basis 
for this thesis, and show that we can indeed point to a perception of deliberative democracy that 
may serve not just as a normative ideal, but also as a descriptive model. As my main concern is 
the study of models of representative democracy, I will take the desirability of democracy and 
the necessity for representation as a given. The relation between voter, representative and the 
final decisions made is therefore the basis for these two perspectives.  
The first perspective is the one I perceive as the dominant perspective in current political 
science, and the basis for much of the current democracy trends in the western world.  I choose 
to call this aggregative democracy. The defining terms for this view is citizen preference and 
responsiveness to this preference. Individual preference exists a priori, is formulated by the 
citizen, taken as input to the political process which gives a political outcome. The representative 
is viewed as a delegate and receives his legitimacy from the voting power awarded him by the 
citizens. Equality, through an equal distribution of political power, is the primary goal of the 
democratic process.  
The term aggregative democracy, as used in this thesis, is taken from Amy Gutmann and 
Dennis Thompson’s book Why deliberative democracy? (2004:13-21). It is sometimes referred 
to as liberal democracy, a term I find to be somewhat misleading as it is not the only relevant 
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take on democracy even from a liberal perspective. Indeed, the Rawlsian revival of liberalist 
theory undermines the rational choice theory that modern aggregative democracy is based upon. 
Despite this and other arguments to why aggregative democracy and rational choice theory have 
their weaknesses, they still persists as the most prevalent ways of understanding politics in 
contemporary political science (Dryzek 2000:31-33). 
The second view of democracy is based on quite different assumptions and ideas of 
democracy.  Like Gutmann and Thompson (2004:13-21) I refer to this as deliberative 
democracy. This perspective is not contrary to the first in the sense that they are incompatible. 
Not every aspect of democracy can be explained by differences in power and self-interested 
behaviour, and everything can certainly not be explained by deliberative principles. I consider 
power-oriented and deliberative explanations to be complimentary ways of analysing democracy 
in order to gain as complete an understanding of it as possible.  
Deliberation is a word that defies a single comprehensive definition, and has many uses both 
in political theory and common usage. Before going any further I find it fruitful to devote some 
space to the definition of the concept itself. 
2.1.1 Defining deliberation 
Robert E. Goodin (2003:54) takes the first step in defining deliberation as “weighing of 
reasons for and against a course of action.” In the sense used here, it must however be more than 
introspective reasoning, it must be a public form of reasoning conducted within what Jürgen 
Habermas(1989[1962]:249) refers to as  a “public sphere”.   
It must be an environment in which communication is equal and distributed, and where there 
is an opportunity for immediate reply to statements. Posing a statement in a public forum may be 
termed as the equivalent to “posting notices for all to read”, but it doesn’t become deliberation 
until it is heard, internalized and responded to (Goodin 2003:60). More than this, deliberation 
must also be geared towards forming public opinions not restricted by authoritarian power 
(Habermas 1989[1962]:249). Participants in deliberation must thus have the common goal in 
mind of forming a public opinion that can be put into action. To be open to reaching a consensus 
with your opponents is thus a minimum prerequisite for deliberation. This does not mean that 
deliberation must necessarily result in one. 
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This public sphere doesn’t necessarily have to be a single all-encompassing forum of 
discussion; Habermas envisions a system of many overlapping spheres of deliberation. This 
opens for the opportunity of a system with parties as individual public spheres in which 
deliberation is conducted that overlaps with the public sphere of the representative body, in 
which deliberation is conducted between members of various parties. The question is thus 
whether this system makes for poorer deliberation than a system where parties don’t exist to 
form public spheres of their own. 
2.2 Aggregative and deliberative – two different perspectives on 
democracy 
Samuel Freeman (2000:373) is among the writers to argue that deliberation serves as a 
political ideal, not as a way of understanding politics. It certainly appears true that most theorists 
that cover the subject write about it in normative terms. It is, however, possible to think of 
deliberation as an analytical tool for understanding politics that may hold explanatory value 
regardless of one’s normative point of view.  Francis Sejerstedt (1983:60, my translation) is 
among the writers to put an emphasis not only on the normative side, describing the division 
between aggregative and deliberative politics like this: 
In reality, we are speaking of two rather fundamentally different views of what politics is, based on 
different views of humanity, and with great consequences both for the analytical and normative content of 
political theory. 
According to Sejerstedt (1983:68-9), there has clearly been a tendency to over-emphasize 
conflicts of interest in analysis of politics in Norway. Historically, he claims that for the most 
part the success of one group is not at the cost of any other – there have been no major conflicts 
of interest. Consensus about interest questions seems to be prevalent; the actors are largely 
committed to the common good. Division and regime changes have not come about because of 
conflicts of interest but because of conflicts of management. As such he argues that what I have 
called the aggregative view of politics significantly misrepresents the historical nature of politics 
in Norway. I see little reason why we should assume Norway to be exceptional in this case. 
Through this chapter I intend to show that a deliberative perspective can indeed be used as a 
way to understand politics that may give insight into politics, where a purely aggregative model 
of explanation fails. During this discussion it is important to keep in mind that this is a discussion 
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of ideal types and ideal models. I do not believe that either model completely explains empirical 
reality, but they present two different ideals against which empirical observations can be 
measured in order to identify important mechanisms. 
2.2.1 Different views of the citizen 
As Sejerstedt points out, the difference between aggregative and deliberative democracy can 
be traced back to two different ideas about the citizen, or for that matter human nature. 
Aggregative democracy has its root in economically oriented theories of behaviour, with a 
tendency to view the citizen as a homo economicus. Theories of deliberative democracy tend to 
view the citizen as an individual guided by reason and a sense of fairness, more in keeping with 
the philosophical tradition associated with republicanism and communitarianism, but still held by 
early liberalist philosophers. Although they can be classified as two quite distinct ideal models of 
man, both models of democracy could allow some “softening” of the stereotypes without 
completely destroying the fundaments they rest on. 
2.2.1.1 Homo economicus 
The origin of homo economicus must be traced back to Thomas Hobbes, who based his 
theories on the idea that self-centredness, even though not necessarily rational, was the basic 
nature of humanity. With rationality added, an ingenious mechanism by which this could lead to 
cooperation and mutually beneficial arrangements was invented by Adam Smith 
(2001[1776]:IV.2.9) through his conception of “the invisible hand” of the market. It was 
however not Smith himself that proclaimed this as a general model for the nature of humanity. 
Smith perceived people as characterised by moral sentiment. His theory of the invisible hand was 
meant solely as a model for market behaviour (Monroe 1991:1-2; Smith 2001[1757]:1-I-I).  
The actual concept of homo economicus is said to come from John Stuart Mill (1967[1836]), 
although the term itself was coined by his critics (Persky 1995:222). It is however important to 
note that Mill (much like Smith) coined his homo economicus not as a description of the driving 
forces of human behaviour, merely as a descriptive to limit the discipline of political economy.  
Those who moved homo economicus from the area of economics to politics and made it into a 
more general theory of human behaviour were the 20th century theorists now associated with the 
rational actor theories, first and foremost among them Joseph Schumpeter, Anthony Downs and 
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Kenneth Arrow (Almond 1990:117-121; Arrow 1951; Downs 1957; Monroe 1991:2-4; 
Schumpeter 1962[1942]). 
In his essay “On the Definition of Political Economy; and on the Method of Investigation 
proper to it,” Mill 1967[1836]:321-2) describes the view of man that is the basis of political 
economy: 
[Political economy] is concerned with [man] solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is 
capable of judging of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end. It predicts only such of the 
phenomena of the social state as take place in consequence of the pursuit of wealth. It makes entire 
abstraction of every other human passion or motive; except those which may be regarded as perpetually 
antagonizing principles to the desire of wealth, namely, aversion to labour, and desire of the present 
enjoyment of costly indulgences. 
Mill identifies the view of man in political economy with a rather narrow set of interests. The 
only interests of man as far as political economy is concerned are accumulation, leisure, luxury 
and procreation. This has been the basis for most economic thought in the centuries since (Persky 
1995:223). The essence of the homo economicus as used today is a human being who always 
behaves rationally. When presented with a choice, economic man will invariably make the 
choice that improves his personal utility the most. In economics this is represented by a utility 
function that shows which effect in utility the individual gets from different sets of choices.  
Contemporary rational actor theory has not deviated much from the original definition laid 
out by Mill. To defend the application of market analogies to the study of politics, homo 
economicus is still defined in very similar terms. 
A major problem for liberalism in the last near-century has been that much of the theory has 
hinged on the concept of the homo economicus which clearly deviates from commonly accepted 
ideals of morality and norms of acceptable behaviour. Even in economics, the rationality 
assumption is under pressure. Experimental economics, experimental psychology and election 
research have made it apparent that narrow selfish rationality fails to explain both economic and 
voter behaviour. There is evidence that people both have a propensity to cooperate without 
personal benefit and a sense of fairness in relation with other people even without the possibility 
for being punished for their actions. As such it seems that both empirical studies and common 
sense seem to contradict the supposition of the selfish homo economicus (Edlin et al. 2007; 
Gintis 2000; Henrich et al. 2001). For modern economics, the predictive capacity of the models 
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is the primary concern, not the realism of the assumptions. That does not justify the assumptions 
sufficiently for political theory purposes when the goal is to understand the process itself.  
One attempt to save the theory of rational action is to separate the conditions of rationality 
and selfishness. It is conceivable that a citizen might have a preference for community and the 
well-being of his friends even if there was no perceptible gain in terms of Mill’s identified 
interests. As long as such interest could be identified and quantified, it could be included in the 
citizen’s utility function, making his behaviour goal-oriented, but not necessarily selfish. The 
critics’ reply is however that this undermines many of the theoretical assumptions of the model 
itself. The models necessary to map such kinds of behaviour also create paradoxes that require 
ever more complex models to evade. The sheer complexity of some of these approaches serves to 
undermine the usefulness of introducing social preferences to models of rational behaviour 
(Dryzek 2000:32; Edlin et al. 2007; Margolis 1991; Monroe 1991). 
2.2.1.2 The fair and reasonable citizen 
The most classical deliberation theory draws heavily on republican theory in its view of the 
citizen. The classical republican ideal of the altruistic citizen only oriented towards the public 
good (Pocock 1998) is certainly the one that would conform most ideally to deliberative theory. 
It would however be an over-simplification to equate the two. Deliberation does not require an 
altogether altruistic citizen; it requires a fair and reasonable citizen.  
To the fair and reasonable citizen, the idea of private interest must, when the situation 
warrants it, be superseded by the common good.  This is certainly the ideal of the political actor, 
expressed for example by Burke (1999[1774]:4.1.25). Even Adam Smith, credited with the very 
invention of the mechanisms justifying rational actor theory, clearly expresses such a view of 
man in The Theory of the Moral Sentiments (2001[1757]:1-I-I): 
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest 
him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it 
except the pleasure of seeing it. [...]That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of 
fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of 
human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with 
the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not 
altogether without it.   
Smith clearly believes that humanity is driven by other sentiments than the profit maximizing 
behaviour of the marketplace, and this is the main argument behind what I have called “the fair 
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and reasonable citizen”. To be fair and reasonable, one does not necessarily have to be entirely 
altruistic. It is still possible to have a keen self-interest, as Smith alludes to, but the citizen must 
have the capacity to lay these aside in deference to the common good of society and overall 
fairness to legitimate interests of others (Miller 2003:183-4). This is the justice, defined as 
fairness, that John Rawls claims we can expect “[...]under conditions favourable for deliberation 
and judgement in general” (Rawls 1971:48). This reservation is particularly important in terms of 
its implications for the requirements of political life. The citizen is assumed to have an innate 
sense of justice and fairness, but it does not necessarily guide his decisions before he is exposed 
to the reasoned views of others. Rawls traces the difference between rational and reasonable 
thought back to Immanuel Kant and the differences between the categorical and hypothetical 
imperative. Rawls proposes a view of reasonable man as people that are willing to adhere 
faithfully to a set of norms that can be justified as valid for all. Reciprocity is the key word in this 
situation. One can expect rational behaviour, but it is unreasonable to base decisions on premises 
one cannot expect to be acceptable to all (Rawls 2005:47-54).  
A similar line of thought to the reasonable individual is presented by Habermasian theorists 
as the concept of the “generalized other” with which the individual should be able to sympathise 
(Eriksen and Weigård 1999:80-84). Also with reference to Kant, Habermas draws upon the idea 
of principles that are acceptable to all as the basis for a general morality that may in turn lead to 
generally acceptable norms of behaviour (Eriksen and Weigård 1999:95-105).  
2.2.2 Personal interest and the general will 
In The Social Contract, Rousseau (2004[1762]:30) distinguishes between “the will of all” 
and “the general will”, distinguishing between private interest and common interest. As the name 
implies, aggregative democracy focuses on the aggregation of individual interest, while 
deliberative democracy focuses on the best solution for society. This may or may not be the same 
thing. 
In the aggregative model, inherent in the aggregative idea, is a conception of interest as 
something constant and preordained. The citizen already has a set of interests before any process 
begins, and the political process does not change these interests. If the behaviour of the 
individual runs contrary to this interest, it must be because of errors of judgement on behalf of 
the citizen. Within such a paradigm, the concept of the general will makes no sense at all. Only 
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individuals have will and interest, and the will of all can therefore never be anything but the will 
of the sum of the citizens. 
For the deliberative democratic theorist, this question is not so simple. Interest is not a 
precursor to the political process, but formed as a part of it. Habermas’ Theory of communicative 
action (1984) focuses on the concepts of collective rationality and intersubjective reality.  The 
very reality the individual lives in is shaped by his relation to other individuals.  
The citizen may enter the process with an idea of what he wants, but it is only through the 
measuring of his ideas against the ideas of others and the accumulation of information that 
interest is shaped. The preferences of the citizen are shaped by the social reality he is part of, and 
the necessity to act as a reasonable individual. As discussed previously, individual preference 
may or may not be important to the outcome of the process, but the goal of the process is finding 
the best solution for society as a whole, whether as the sum of the good of individuals or 
Rousseau’s general will. 
We can say that there is a difference in level of analysis between the two ways of describing 
democracy. In the aggregative democracy, interest is analyzed on the level of the citizen, while in 
deliberative democracy; interest is analyzed at the level of the common good. 
2.2.3 The focus of democracy 
Different views of the citizens, different views of the nature of interest and different levels of 
analysis lead to a different perspective about how agents in the political are expected to behave, 
which in turn decides how the system itself is shaped and understood. 
Heinz Eulau, John C. Wahlke, William Buchanan and Leroy C. Ferguson (1959) examine the 
works of Edmund Burke to arrive at two important analytical notions of democratic 
representation: democratic focus and style. Both of these are important for this discussion. I will 
first discuss the focus and return to include the style of democracy in section 2.2.4. 
Democratic focus concerns itself with what the concern of democratic representatives is, or 
should be. Burke (1999[1774]:4.1.25) differentiates between a national and a local focus for the 
representatives of parliament: 
Parliament is not a Congress of Ambassadors from different and hostile interests; which interests each must 
maintain, as an Agent and Advocate, against other Agents and Advocates; but Parliament is a deliberative 
Assembly of one Nation, with one Interest, that of the whole; where, not local Purposes, not local 
Prejudices ought to guide, but the general Good, resulting from the general Reason of the whole. 
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In Burke’s portrayal of representatives in a national congress with a local focus, they would 
seek the best solutions for their local constituencies, naturally seeing each others as competitors 
for power. With a national focus they would deliberate in order to act in the best interest of the 
nation. This is also the principal distinction Eulau et al. (1959) make in their research. Their 
comparative analyses have examined differences between state and district orientation in 
American state legislatures. 
In light of Rousseau’s distinction in the precluding section, I will also interpret the focus of 
democracy in a somewhat more general sense than what Eulau et al. do in their article. Rather 
than differentiating between a “local” and “national” focus, I differentiate between a specialist 
and a general focus. A general focus means that the representative focuses on the common good 
of the entire group the body in question is elected to represent. A specialist focus will in this 
interpretation mean that the representative focuses on the interest of any group or even single 
individual within the entirety of the group represented. This would most likely be the 
representative’s constituency, but could also be his party, another group he identifies with or 
even his own self interest. The important distinction is that a specialist focus means that one 
focuses on the interests of a unit less than the general interest of the entire group to be 
represented. 
In an aggregative democracy, the representative is assumed to represent the aggregated 
preferences of his constituents. The nature of interest as predetermined on the individual level 
makes consideration of the general will meaningless if this is taken to mean something different 
than the sum of individual preferences. The aggregative representative must thus by definition 
have a specialist focus.  
In deliberative democracy, where decisions are to be reached through deliberation, strict 
adherence to the preferences of any single individual or group becomes meaningless. To be able 
to convince others of an argument’s merits without resorting to outside influences or mere 
bargaining requires appeal to universal ideals or values. This does in turn require that the ideal 
for the representative is a general focus. 
2.2.4 The style of democracy 
The other parameter which Eulau et al. (1959:744-5) draw from Burke is the style of 
democracy. The two are closely connected; indeed Burke (1999[1774]:4.1.25) seems to think 
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they follow naturally from each other. Eulau et al., on the other hand, find it important to treat 
them distinctly. Style relates itself to how representatives behave, whether they merely follow 
dictates from their voters or make judgements on their behalf. Eulau et al. (Eulau et al. 1959:749-
50) refer to two distinct stylistic roles, the Delegate and the Trustee3. In the former role, the 
representative should not make decisions based upon his independent convictions and 
judgement, but should take instructions from his constituents in all important matters. In the 
trustee role, the representative should not take instructions from his constituents after he is 
elected. He should act as a free agent, using his own judgements and principles as a basis for 
making decisions on behalf of his constituents. Ideally, this extends to making “the right 
decision” even if directly contrary to the expressed wishes of his electorate. 
For the purpose of this discussion, I shall not view these as exclusive archetypes in which we 
can fit each representative, but rather as different views about the ideal behaviour of a 
representative. In an aggregative model of democracy, it should be apparent that the delegate 
style is to be preferred. The main job of the representative is aggregation of the preferences of his 
voters, and it therefore follows that these voiced interests are what must guide his decisions. In 
the deliberative model, however, the representative is expected to make judgements based on his 
own reason and judgement. This necessitates a willingness to allow him at least partially the 
status of a free agent through the role as a trustee. We may expect him to deliberate both with his 
constituency and with other representatives, but in the end it is the enlightenment such 
deliberation instils in him that should be the basis for his decisions. 
 
Figure 1: Focus and style of democracy 
 Aggregative Deliberative 
Focus Citizen Common good 
Style Delegate Trustee 
 
                                                 
3
 They also refer to a third category, the Politico, but this is merely a middle position between the two other. For 
the purposes of this thesis, I consider a dichotomous categorization sufficient. 
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2.2.5 The political process 
The aspects of democracy discussed above have severe implications for how one views the 
political process. Thus the two different views of democracy implicate quite different political 
processes. A citizen-oriented process of aggregation will by necessity be quite different from an 
output-oriented deliberative process. 
2.2.5.1 The aggregative process 
I have previously ascertained that the analytical focus of the aggregative democracy is the 
citizen rather than society, and that there are two conflicting views of the citizen. The 
aggregative theorist sees the citizen as a selfish and rational homo economicus, while the 
deliberative theorist considers the citizen a reasonable being concerned with fairness. From this 
follows a natural inclination to take different perspectives in analyzing democracy.  
In aggregative democracy, the pursuit of individual interest by each citizen must necessarily 
lead to conflict, and these conflicts are what the political process is about. Who has power, how 
it is distributed and what this can tell us about the nature of these conflicts becomes very 
important. This line of thinking has its roots in Machiavelli, and has resulted in a diverse set of 
political theories. What all of these theories share is the focus on power as the driving force of 
politics. Analysis of politics, understood as political conflicts should thus focus on studying 
power (Eriksen and Weigård 1999:14-20). 
To achieve fairness and equality for all citizens, it is necessary to distribute power evenly to 
make sure that everyone has equal opportunity to pursue their interests. Once this is achieved, 
the aggregative nature of politics should naturally ensure that the outcomes benefit society as a 
whole as much as possible, when this is defined as the sum of benefit to its citizens. This line of 
thinking is basically inspired by economics, for example the thinking of Willifredo Pareto about 
the optimal distribution of resources. 
The basic principle is for public preference to be derived from the aggregation of individual 
preference. Market-like theories and analogies are applied to a great degree to describe how this 
can be possible. The election process becomes fundamental in this regard, as it embodies 
bestowing administrative and coercive power unto individuals (Eriksen 1995:33; Jenssen 
1996:32-33). 
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Robert Dahl describes some of the most fundamental conditions of aggregative democracy in 
his book Polyarchy (1971)4. It is evident on the very first pages of his book, where he starts out 
by outlining the most important assumptions of his model: 
I assume that the key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to 
the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals. […] 
I assume further that in order for a government to continue over a period of time to be responsive to the 
preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals, all full citizens must have impaired opportunities: 
To formulate their preferences. 
To signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action. 
To have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government, that is, weighed with no 
discrimination because of the content or source of the preference” (Dahl 1971:1-2). 
These can be said to be the basic premises of the aggregative process as a whole. They 
introduce one very central assumption: That of pre-existing preferences. Each individual that has 
a stake in government should according to the theories of rational action have clear preferences 
for the outcomes of the political process. These should exist completely distinct from the process 
itself, or be exogenous in economic parlance. The preferences themselves are given by the 
natural self-interest of the citizens, and only perceptions of them could be prone to change given 
no actual changes in external premises. Should preferences appear to change in the course of the 
process, it should either be explained as a distortion or misrepresentation of the true interests of 
the citizens and thus a source of an ineffective process, alternatively as a correction of errors in 
the formulation of interests.  
                                                 
4
 It is possible to read a certain deliberative component into Dahl’s polyarchy through the  “inclusiveness” or 
“right to participate” dimension included in his categorization of democracy (Dahl 1971:5-9). In the way of 
procedures, it is however my opinion of Dahl’s work as presented in Polyarchy (1971) and On Democracy (2000) 
that he leans clearly towards the side of aggregation through his focus on elections as the main mechanism of 
preference formulation as well as the very point of origin in pre-existing preferences. In addition, the criterion of 
exclusiveness he emphasizes seems to be restricted to the absence of exclusion from elections. Regardless of 
whether or not the reader agrees with me in this, Dahl’s formulated assumptions still describe the necessary 
assumptions of aggregative democracy rather well. 
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Figure 2: A representation of the aggregative political process 
 
In this system, the political process is not a goal in itself; its purpose is merely to be a method 
of aggregating preferences. Joseph Schumpeter (1962[1942]:242) described its goal as reducing 
the cost of making decisions through being the most efficient aggregation mechanism possible. 
The true source of legitimacy in aggregative democracy is the closeness by which the political 
outcomes represent the pre-existing preferences of the citizens, or rather the belief of the citizens 
in the degree to which the political process ensures this. 
The process is uni-directional with a fixed input that is handled by the process, making 
political outcomes that comply as closely as possible with the pre-existing preferences of the 
citizens. Possibilities for distortion of this process exists both in the formulation stage, 
aggregation stage and policy response stage if the process proves for example not to be robust 
enough against pressure from external interests or other mediating factors. To produce 
acceptable outcomes, participants in the process must have both sufficient and completely equal 
opportunities to formulate their preferences. Secondly, the political process must have sufficient 
provision to handle and aggregate these formulated preferences into a societal preference. 
Thirdly, the government must have sufficient mechanisms to correctly identify the policy 
responses that correspond with the expressed societal preference for political outcomes. Failures 
in either of these steps lead to outcomes that deviate from the pre-existing preferences of the 
citizens, and we can expect failures in each of the three steps to be cumulative. 
The most important aggregation method today is the election of representatives. Competing 
representatives or factions formulate their programs. The degree to which they coincide with the 
formulated preference of the citizens is then measured through election. An input of votes into 
the aggregative process constitutes the formulation of a priori interests, while an output of 
parliamentary power is transformed into government responses to policy issues (Habermas 
1995:33; Jenssen 1996:31-34). 
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The nature of aggregation itself makes the election forward-looking and promissory. The 
representative is elected on the basis of pledges or promises on how he will employ the power 
vested in him (Mansbridge 2003:516).  
2.2.5.2 The deliberative process  
In deliberative democracy, aggregating the preferences of the individual is not the primary 
concern of the political process. Rather, the process is viewed as an epistemological journey 
towards the most favourable outcome for society as a whole, reaching a rational conclusion that 
is in the common interest. This may or may not conflict with the personal preferences of a 
majority of the citizens, although it seems reasonable to assume that the interest (although not 
necessarily the expressed interest) of the majority and the interests of the nation as a whole will 
often coincide.  
In the ideal deliberative democracy, all citizens would deliberate amongst themselves, being 
exposed to Rawls’(Rawls 1971:48) “favourable circumstances”, reaching a conclusion by debate. 
If the outcome of the debate was not conclusive, a vote would be possible, with each citizen 
asserting his preferences within the realm of the reasonable. As stated in the introduction of this 
chapter, I have presupposed that this is not the situation in a modern democracy. The size and 
scope of democracy makes representation necessary to make decisions. 
The deliberative political process is founded on the idea of the reasonable citizen, but also on 
the reasonable representative. Rather than seek to aggregate in order to reach the true will of the 
people, the deliberative process seeks to find the solutions in the best interest of the people. As 
each citizen has not participated in the whole of the deliberative process, neither can the 
expressed will of the majority be seen as the sole legitimization of a political decision. The 
arguments of the citizen insofar as he has been part of the process are important, but the mere 
statement of his will is not. The role of the representative is that of the trustee, entrusted by the 
citizen with the faculty of reason and the power to reach a decision based on deliberation in 
which the citizen can expect his arguments to be heard and given equal weight to that of others 
(Bessette 1994:40-46; Burke 1999[1774]).  
Deliberative thought is not founded on the conflict of interest as the fundamental driving 
force of society. As each citizen is assumed to at least respect everyone else’s need as equally 
legitimate to one’s own, it is not assumed that a concentration of power necessarily leads to 
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abuse. Rather than focusing on limiting the amount of power a citizen can have over any other, 
transparency in the application of power becomes more important. Transparent uses of power 
makes it possible to subject any use of power to deliberation in order to discover whether or not 
it is in the best interest of the people. 
Deliberative theorists have long struggled with how to explain the necessity or benefit of 
voting at all in a deliberative context. How can voting and elections play a part if the ideal is a 
deliberative consensus? At the same time we must concede that large scale democracy appears to 
be impossible without electing leaders and voting. Dryzek (2000:38) points out how critics have 
claimed that since there is no room for voting “there is no such thing as deliberative democracy” 
or that deliberative theorists “wish away the vulgar fact that under democracy deliberation ends 
in voting”. In practical democracy it is of course inevitable that decisions have to be made by 
voting. The need for basic efficiency makes it impossible to pass every decision by unanimous 
consent. 
Jürgen Habermas (1996:29; 2005:390) made an important turn late in his career, managing to 
explain how voting and elections are necessary for real deliberative politics and for making 
deliberative democracy possible, in reality reconciling a radical theory of deliberation with the 
institutions of constitutional democracy, so far owned by liberalism. Habermas’ change of focus, 
or even “defection” as it has been characterized by some (Dryzek 2000:27), lies in the 
acceptance that the practical implementation of deliberative politics require some pragmatic 
solutions to make politics as deliberative as possible. Voting and elections become a way of 
storing power from deliberation, an interim transfer of communicative power from deliberation 
in the electorate to legislative deliberation. The election measures the support in the electorate 
for the positions presented and deliberated upon by each candidate, providing a biased starting 
point for parliamentary deliberation based upon the deliberative judgement of the citizens. This 
“stored” deliberative power can then be employed in the ensuing process. As the citizens invest 
their power in a subset of the people to continue deliberation as a parliament, parliament can in 
turn invest power and the responsibility for deliberation on certain issues to a committee as a 
subset of the parliament. 
Two important differences exist between aggregative and deliberative democracy in the 
transference of power from the voter and the transference to political outcomes. Firstly, the 
voting process does not presume to aggregate the fixed preferences of the citizens, merely the 
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temporary outcomes of their deliberation. Furthermore, the process does not continue with a 
direct transference of this power into political outcomes as assumed in the aggregative process. 
Rather, legislators are expected to continue deliberation, reaching conclusions about the best 
policy responses in order to achieve the best possible outcomes. Finally: in the aggregative 
process, the citizen hands over all power through the act of voting. In the deliberative process, 
the election is not the only process by which the citizen can exert influence. Legislators are 
expected to keep up public deliberation through various channels and the pluralist system. 
Citizens may involve themselves in interest groups, call their congressman or otherwise 
contribute to deliberation throughout the entire process from the first discussion, through election 
campaigns, parliament deliberations and policy design and implementation. Finally, the circle is 
closed, or possibly advances to the next tier of an upwards spinning spiral, when citizen 
deliberation about policy continues leading up to the next election – with the possibility of 
immediate feedback through public deliberation in between. The citizen holds the power to keep 
influencing policy. Policy makers hold the power, not only to influence the citizen’s perceptions 
of their policies, but also to influence their actual preferences through the process of public 
deliberation. At even or uneven intervals, the communicative power of their deliberation will 
once again be measured by election. 
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Figure 3: The deliberative political process 
  
It is possible to claim that this leaves deliberative election with the same vulnerability as 
aggregative election: that the available voting options can never completely represent either the 
deliberative arguments or the aggregative preferences of any voter. With the assumption that the 
representative will behave reasonably, there is however a greater robustness to this choice in 
deliberative democracy. The deliberative election does not need to elect representatives that 
perfectly represent the aggregated will of the citizens. Instead, elected representatives should pay 
sufficient attention to the arguments of the entire citizenry and distance themselves from strong 
biases, either positive or negative, towards the arguments of any particular group.  
2.2.6 Consequences for the study of politics 
This chapter has presented two different democratic processes, or two different ways of 
understanding the political process, with quite different underlying assumptions. Neither model 
should be categorized as purely normative or descriptive. Depending on the point of view of the 
reader, they can be applied as both. 
It should be apparent that strongly deliberative processes will interfere with the mechanisms 
of aggregation and vice-versa. The deliberative process of constant and bilateral influence 
(between representatives and the electorate) clearly undermines the hierarchal structure of 
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aggregation. Likewise, elections, plebiscites and polls legitimized by its aggregative power may 
interfere with the deliberative process by cutting debate short.   
As mentioned earlier, Francis Sejerstedt (1983) shows, at least in the case of Norway, how 
the aggregative model is clearly unable to explain many major divisions in politics. I have 
already pointed out how current western democracy has deviated far from the normative ideal of 
deliberation. Current democratic practice is clearly imperfect by both standards when considered 
as normative ideals. Still, the very aspects that represent a problem of interference when 
considered exclusively in the light of one of the models constitute a point of strength when 
viewed in the light of the other.  
This should be sufficient cause to seek out and apply alternative models to the understanding 
of politics. My belief is that deliberative democracy can exist as a complementary model to the 
aggregative in describing the workings of the political processes. I do not insist that deliberative 
democracy is necessarily a better descriptive tool than the aggregative, but I do maintain that 
they will both be able to explain some part of what goes on in politics. Any political process 
must be assumed to consist of some measure of deliberation as well as some measure of strategic 
application of power, for example through negotiation or the employment of voting power. The 
balance of the two may vary widely; it may even be the case that strategic political action is far 
more common than deliberative. Still, explaining politics solely through the mechanisms of 
aggregative democracy seems a limit that weakens our insight into politics as a whole. Decisions 
are sometimes (perhaps even often) taken in violation of the perceived self-interest. Even if we 
were to consider altruistic behaviour as consistently bad and detrimental to society, the fact that 
it exists means political science must be able to offer explanations of why and how it may 
change political outcomes. 
The prescription for the study of politics must therefore be that we need both aggregative and 
deliberative ways of describing, measuring and defining politics. An exhaustive study of any 
process must necessarily include both the deliberative and aggregative nature of its workings, 
and to which degree the process is characterized by either. Thus we need tools for analyzing 
both. The current state of the science seems to be that we are well outfitted with tools for the 
measurement of aggregative democracy, but poorly stocked with empirical tools that fit 
deliberative politics. My conclusion is therefore that this is something that needs to be remedied. 
We need to find empirical tools that can adequately capture the deliberative nature of politics in 
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order to understand deliberation, its influence and which mechanisms make politics more or less 
deliberative.  
3 Parties and deliberation 
In the previous chapter, I argued that deliberation should be of interest to political science, 
whether one sees it as a normative goal or not. It should therefore be interesting for political 
science to discover which institutional arrangements serve to increase deliberation, and which 
serve to reduce it. I will now explain how we can expect the existence of institutionalized 
political factions, political parties, to reduce the level of deliberation in a democratic system. 
3.1 Political parties research and theory 
“Get the prices right” has been the slogan of economists, and a cure-all for most problems of 
resource allocation. According to Phillipe C. Schmitter (2001:67) political scientists have been 
peddling an almost equally strong slogan: “get the parties right” when it comes to building robust 
democracies. The right system of political parties has been the main tool for aggregation, the 
most reliable mechanism for accountability and the only mechanism for predictable and stable 
government (Schattschneider 1977[1942]:1).  
The above statements are most certainly true for the fields of comparative and behavioural 
studies of politics. Political theorists, with the notable exception of the nation-building early 
post-war era, have on the other hand had a tendency to either ignore the existence of political 
parties or be sceptical of their place in a democratic political system. Nancy Rosenblum has 
made this the topic of her book On the Side of the Angels (2008). As with the study of 
deliberation, there seems to be a clear disconnect in the study of political parties between the 
field of political theory and the rest of political science. As Rosenblum (2008:3) puts it: 
“Political theorists have abandoned the field, and the study of partisanship is carried on in 
[empirically oriented] political science terms”. Even if political parties are considered endemic to 
democracy, the disconnect is visible in the fact that they are not part of almost any definitions of 
democracy, and that national constitutions tend to not take them into account (Stokes 1999:243-
5). Furthermore, even in rational choice and behaviouralist circles, research on parties appear to 
be in decline. There appears to be a growing perception that current research on the topic is 
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“[…]narrow-gauged, methodologically unimaginative, and theoretically thin”  (Reiter 2006:616). 
All in all it appears that there is little satisfaction with the way political parties have been 
handled in political science in recent years and that barriers need to be crossed between theory 
and empirical science in order to create further understanding of a concept that seems deeply 
ingrained in and important to democracy, whether we like it or not. 
The belief in the benefit of parties to democracy still prevails among political scientists even 
if  some also assume that working democracy within parties is next to impossible (Pettitt 
2007:2). This may be explained with heavy influence on party studies by the rational choice 
school (Strom 1990:565). In the aggregative model of democracy, the existence of intraparty 
democracy is unnecessary, since a party that does not represent an attractive basket of opinions 
will fail to attract voters from the citizens and be removed from office. How this basket of 
opinions is created is of little importance.  
For the deliberative model, the assumed non-existence of intraparty democracy poses a larger 
problem. If parties are assumed to be led by small elites with little possibility for internal dissent, 
then their positions can hardly be the result of deliberation. The deliberative process gives the 
best results when deliberation is present at all stages. Non-deliberative processes, especially 
when coupled with methods of coercion, may be severely detrimental to deliberation by 
suppressing voices and arguments that would otherwise add to the debate. There are several 
theories that relate to this. 
3.2 The Iron Law of Oligarchy 
The idea of the naturally authoritarian tendencies of party organization was formulated most 
famously by Robert Michels (1962[1911]). His “iron law of oligarchy” explained how political 
organization leads to oligarchy. He observed how party organization tended to concentrate power 
and how that power took on a strongly conservative character in order to keep political elites in 
control. Parties inevitably moved from being means to an end to becoming ends in themselves. 
Even radical political parties and revolutionary parties, once gaining the strength to concentrate 
enough power at the top, would eventually become members of the same oligarchy. The 
bureaucratic nature of organization would inevitably lead to the suppression of internal dissent 
and the stifling of debate. As parties by nature strive to activate as large a portion of the masses 
as possible, they must “cover internal dissensions with a pious veil” (Michels 1962[1911]:334). 
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This is the idea that Marxists thought would lead to eventual revolution, but Michels also 
discussed how parties were able to sustain themselves, and the system, through the gradual 
transformation by assimilation of new leaders:   
The preponderant elements of the movement, the men who lead and nourish it, end by undergoing a gradual 
detachment from the masses, and are attracted within the orbit of the “political class.” They perhaps 
contribute to this class a more creative energy and enhanced practical intelligence, thus providing for the 
ruling class an ever-renewed youth (Michels 1962[1911]:355).  
The important idea here is that although new ideas are eventually allowed to seep through 
into the political class through the continuous assimilation of new members, the short term way 
of sustaining the political class itself is through the suppression of internal disagreement and 
dissent. In other words: parties sustain themselves through active suppression of deliberation. 
His utterly cynical view of parties turned Michels into a convinced syndicalist, and has 
generally made his theories lose much of their credence in contemporary political science. They 
do, however, still touch upon the heart of the matter. The core of his theories is still extremely 
influential in political science today, even if perhaps not always identified as such. His main 
claim that political parties are authoritarian by nature may be traced to the very strong tendency 
to analyse parties as unitary actors. The striking lack of interest in analyzing the internal 
workings and the effects parties themselves exert on democracy and the state might be another 
reason for this disillusionment. A third might be the focus on aggregative models, in which the 
internal workings of parties are not particularly important (Wolinetz 1998:xv). 
There are three important mechanisms by which Michel’s iron law worked (Pettitt 
2007:7): 
1) The need for professional leadership. 
2) The gratitude of party members. 
3) The laws of tactics. 
The need for leadership in a large state or organization should not be very controversial. This 
point is made by both Plato and Rousseau, who thought that the very idea of democracy was 
impossible without a class of unfree slaves to cater to the needs of those who must constantly 
engage themselves in politics (Rousseau 2004[1762]:77-9). This leadership, the political class, 
concentrates power, which in turn leads to a tendency to wish to preserve that power. Rousseau, 
Plato and Michels reject representative government (proposing different alternatives) partly on 
these grounds. The very idea of representative government, however, was instituted in order to 
25 
 
remedy these problems. John Stuart Mill (1991[1861]:80), and indeed the mainstream political 
thought following him, see it as the remedy rather than the problem. While not rejecting the 
authoritarian influences of large scale organization, the effect political involvement has on 
educating the masses is assumed to be a counteracting influence, certainly vital to the idea of 
public deliberation (Pettitt 2007:7-8). 
Gratitude of the party members to those in power deals with the idea of not wanting to 
assume the responsibility of leadership and decision making oneself. There is much to suggest 
that this is a prevalent attitude among democratic citizens (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002:1-2), 
but also research to show that the tendency is not entirely universal (Pettitt 2007:8).   
The rise of rational choice theory has certainly made the importance of studying politics in 
terms of tactical behaviour a lot more accepted than it was in Michels’ days. His tactics argument 
bases itself on the concept of “caesarism” or “Bonapartist ideology” (Michels 1962[1911]:212-
23) as necessary for any party that wishes to compete for power. With these concepts, Michels 
refers to the tendency for the political leader to identify the will of the people with himself. As 
the supreme representative of the people, the political leader accepts that it is the people’s will 
that he wields power on their behalf even to the point of reducing the power of the people over 
government. Once elected, opposition to the elected representative of the people becomes 
tantamount to opposition to the will of the people itself. Tactics enter into the mix when internal 
dissent in the party is sacrificed on the altar of “the larger cause” of fulfilling the electoral 
mandate of the people by tactical support of the party’s leaders in the political struggle over 
government policy. These tactical considerations become much more important for a party in 
government or which has government ambitions (Pettitt 2007:9). 
Michels terms his thesis not as a theory but an “iron law”, underlining his absolutist view of 
the mechanisms he describes. This has led some to discard it as outdated and irrelevant for 
modern political science, the amount of research regarding it over the last couple of decades 
speaks a different truth (Leach 2005; Pettitt 2007; Rohrschneider 1994; Rucht 1999; Voss and 
Sherman 2000). The sum of research on Michels indicates that modern democracy appears to 
have proven that modern party-based democracy has certain oligarchic tendencies, but the many 
examples that can be found of parties and groups breaking the trend indicate that it does not 
seem justified to call it an “iron law”. 
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Even if Michels’ law has to be reduced to the level of a theory on the oligarchic tendency of 
political parties, the impact on deliberation may still be significant. Should it still prove to hold 
true as a general trend, we may expect that strong party organization, as seen in many European 
countries, may have the side effect of diminishing deliberation in the political system. 
Particularly the second and third arguments supporting the law appear to be directly related to 
deliberative practice in democracy. Party members’ gratitude is in reality a method of outside 
influence that lead party members to make other considerations than the force of the better 
argument the deciding factor in decision making. The same may be said of both tactical 
behaviour by parties and by party members seeking the fulfilment of future goals rather than 
focusing on making the best decision in the matter at hand. 
3.3 Group polarization 
Michels’ “Iron Law” portrays parties as debate arenas that provide very little room for a 
deliberative climate. Cass Sunstein has put forward another law that is very interesting in the 
deliberative perspective. In his article “The Law of Group Polarization” (Sunstein 2003) he 
shows that even if there might be deliberation within parties, that may not be a good thing for the 
overall deliberation in the political system. It is not deliberation itself that is the problem, but the 
existence of arenas for sub-deliberation that undermine and weaken unconstrained public 
deliberation.  
The basic premise of Sunstein’s paper is that people “enter discussion with one view and 
leave with another” (Sunstein 2003:81), also a basic assumption of deliberative theory. What 
Sunstein is concerned about is in what direction their views are likely to change in real 
deliberative settings. Sunstein finds a striking statistic regularity of group polarization: “...that 
members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction 
indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies” (Sunstein 2003:81).  
The likelihood of such shifts is not the same for all kinds of group deliberation. In particular 
“groups with some kind of shared salient identity (like Republicans, Democrats, and lawyers, but 
unlike jurors and experimental subjects)” (Sunstein 2003:81) are subject to this. Internal 
deliberation in a political party can therefore be expected to have a particularly polarizing effect 
on its members. Furthermore, groups that base themselves on identification with a social group 
increases this effect, particularly when one has a rival “outgroup” (Sunstein 2003:85). This is a 
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description that seems to fit very well with the traditional class-based parties of the labour 
movement, agrarian parties and the like.  
Sunstein also points out that the polarization of groups need not necessarily be a problem for 
democracy in and of itself. So-called “enclave deliberation” may in fact strengthen groups with 
an initially weak voice, increasing the number of available opinions (Sunstein 2003:93-5). This 
might particularly justify supporting political parties to actually strengthen deliberative 
democracy in societies dominated by the repression of the interests of particular groups, like the 
labour movement in the early 20th century. The “mass party” described by Maurice Duverger 
(1963[1951]) could fit rather well with this line of reasoning. There seems, however, to be a 
general consensus that modern western democracies are moving away from this model of party 
organizations. Political parties that represent particular underprivileged groups are no longer the 
norm. No single theory of “the new party” seems to be prevalent, but political theorists now 
speak of models such as the “catch-all party”, the “electoral-professional party”, the “cadre 
party” or the “cartel party” and several more (Daalder 2001:48-9). Neither of these models 
presents the modern party as a group that could plausibly fill Sunstein’s role in creating 
beneficial enclave deliberation.  
If political parties indeed work as a system for political polarization of groups, it does not 
bode well for deliberation. Deliberation requires openness and a will to bend to the better 
argument. As a minimum that means debate where all facts and arguments are laid on the table in 
a truthful manner. Group deliberation in advance, with little exposure to diverging opinion could 
then serve to create an environment for discussion with strong positions taken a priori with great 
robustness to counterarguments.  
3.4 The benefits of parties and their respective downsides 
As mentioned before, there has been surprisingly little research done on how parties actually 
function and what effects they have on democracy (Wolinetz 1998:xv). Among those to discuss 
the topic is Schmitter (2001), who considers the most important functions parties are supposed to 
have on democracy: 
1. Structuring electoral competition through nomination. 
2. Providing symbolic identity. 
3. Forming government and providing structure to the legislative process. 
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4. Aggregating interests and passions. 
With the assumption that parties fulfil these primary functions, their organization has become 
so intertwined with the idea of liberal democracy that it is near impossible to conceive of 
democratic states without them. This is especially true since modern states that have strived to be 
without the divisiveness of parties have most often turned out to become dictatorships rather than 
deliberative utopias.  
From a pragmatic point of view, Schmitter’s functions can easily be seen as effects that 
improve on the political process by structuring, ordering and simplifying to make the political 
machinery run all the more smoothly. A process without them, especially in large scale, would 
easily become so chaotic it would be greatly prone to abuse. Nevertheless, it is with careful 
examination of each effect easy to envision a possible side effect that would work directly to 
reduce the level of deliberation. 
The structuring function of parties constitutes “...offering to citizens aggregated in territorial 
constituencies a choice between alternative sets of leaders” (Schmitter 2001:72). He points to 
this as the primary function of any political party (Schmitter 2001:74). In order to reduce the 
number of potential candidates to a manageable level, some candidates have to be discarded. In 
order to make an informed choice about who are to be prequalified to compete for the voters, a 
smaller group than the entire electorate have to be responsible. On both these two levels of 
exclusion, other opinions and choices are excluded, in effect being taken off the agenda before 
public deliberation in the entire electorate is an opportunity.  
We could expect this to be stronger or weaker in different types of parties and different types 
of elections. With a system of primaries, particularly with a caucus model, a rather large number 
of people are included in the decision. In the typical European model, however, particularly in 
the Norwegian system I am most familiar with; the nomination process is conducted entirely by 
the active members of the party. Party members constitute only a small portion of the population, 
and even within the party, there are some smaller groups with much more influence over the 
process than others. It all serves the expediency of being able to make decisions efficiently, but it 
is every step of the way based on the need to reduce the number of people participating and the 
number of opinions taken into consideration. 
As presented in section 2.2.5.2, Habermas’ deliberative defence of elections rest on them as a 
way to measure and store deliberative power. Naturally, the more intermediaries there are 
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between the electorate and the candidates, the weaker this effect will be. In many cases several 
(or even most) candidates never get the opportunity to present themselves to the electorate 
beyond the party because they are excluded in the nomination process. Candidates that are 
nominated may still not even be known to the constituency as riding on the party ticket may 
mean they benefit from the trust the electorate has in the party itself, or even another candidate 
from the same party. 
Single seat constituencies and primary elections might be possible improvements from a 
deliberative perspective as they connect the candidate more directly to the electorate, thus 
increasing the possibility for deliberation with, and about, each candidate. 
Symbolic identity is the second of Schmitter’s important party functions, and a continuation 
of the structuring process. The formation of symbolic identity is seen as a gradual process by 
which the parties that 
“... provide most citizens with a stable and distinctive set of ideas and goals (symbols) that anchor their 
expectations about democracy, orient them in a general way toward policy options, and make them feel part 
of the process of collective choice” (Schmitter 2001:72). 
Important here is the ability to “orient them in a general way toward policy options”. This is 
also particularly troublesome from a deliberative perspective. If one is already “generally 
oriented” towards something, it would of course mean carrying a bias towards those options. 
Furthermore, this orientation does not in Schmitter’s view come first and foremost from 
deliberative processes, but from the party’s “...capacity to manipulate symbols and memories in 
such a way that, over time, individuals come to identify exclusively with one party” (Schmitter 
2001:76). Once again it is a process completely at odds with the deliberative process that 
demands that decisions are made based upon truthful and open information shared freely, not the 
manipulation of symbols and memories. Once again, an effect that may be expedient to the 
political process may be so at the expense of reducing deliberation. 
The forming of government function could appear very innocent and necessary also from a 
deliberative perspective. Even in a purely deliberative system, someone must be able to 
efficiently carry out the decisions cast by the whole. Schmitter’s analysis of what is necessary for 
this function, gives a very different idea: “Note that, in order to do this well, parties should be 
capable of maintaining a consistently high level of internal discipline during their terms in 
office” (Schmitter 2001:73). This is an argument that plays straight into the hands of Michels. 
The need for internal discipline would once again be directly at odds with the need for 
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deliberation. Whether it means that some arguments and suggestions are to be suppressed 
completely or merely kept within the party, it would mean that they would be unavailable for the 
general public. Internal discipline could also mean that representatives are required to vote 
loyally for their government, making decisions on a different basis than the one informed by 
deliberation in which they participate. 
The parties’ function of aggregating interests and passions is presented by Schmitter as more 
of an underlying assumption of the three preceding functions. This may be a function that in and 
of itself is not necessarily inimical to deliberation. On the other hand, neither is it a function that 
is particularly relevant from the deliberative perspective. 
In conclusion, when considering Schmitter’s work, it seems like three out of the four 
important benefits of political parties seem to be derived from mechanisms that might be actively 
detrimental to deliberation.  
3.5 Conclusions on parties and deliberation 
In this chapter I have examined three different theories of relevance to political parties that 
all appear to indicate that the very mechanisms that make political parties effective and 
successful are mechanisms that work to the detriment of deliberation in the political system. This 
should be a strong enough theoretical basis to at least raise the concern that this connection may 
be true. If one seeks to understand the relationship between political institutions and deliberative 
practice, it should therefore be interesting to subject this theory to empirical testing. That will be 
the focus of the rest of this thesis. 
4 Approaches to the study of deliberative politics 
As presented in chapter 1.1 my goal is to explore the effect organized factions have on 
deliberation, and to aid in bringing empirical political science and political theory together in 
order to be able to draw on the strengths of both.  
A major hurdle stands in the way of such studies, namely finding a way to capture and 
evaluate the deliberativeness of any given debate. In order to be able to study deliberation - both 
in terms of who is more or less deliberative, where deliberation exists, and what the outcomes of 
more and less deliberative debate are - one has to be able to identify and evaluate the level of 
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deliberation in a given debate. As simple as it may sound, this is no trivial undertaking. A 
testament to this is the plethora of methods that have been proposed over the last few decades, 
only some of which have ever made the step into real world testing at more than a minor scale. 
Edward L. Lascher wrote about this in his 1996 article “Assessing Legislative Deliberation: 
A Preface to Empirical Analysis”. He predicted a “golden age” of empirical research on 
deliberation in legislative assemblies, but came to the following conclusion about the current 
state of research (Lascher 1996:502): 
“But let me be blunt: we are presently ill-prepared to assess legislative deliberation in practice, let alone to 
make recommendations for institutional reform. 
The biggest problem is an empirical one. While there are some rich single or multiple case studies that 
underscore the importance of deliberation (e.g., Derthick and Quirk 1985), there is little in the way of 
systematic, comparative research. For example, I am unaware of any study applying a set of standards to 
compare outcomes in processes that are relatively more and relatively less deliberative.” 
The field seems to have made some movement since 1996, but the inadequacies pointed out 
by Lascher are still relevant.  
In this chapter I will look at different approaches to the study of deliberative politics. First, I 
will look at the requirements of a method by which deliberative politics may be studied 
empirically and draw up three criteria such methods can be evaluated by. Then I will proceed to 
examine four different methods that each appear to have some strengths that make them useful 
for such a project. Finally, at the end of the chapter, I make a structured comparison of them to 
arrive at the method that best seems to satisfy all three criteria and thus be the most likely 
candidate for the best method of studying deliberative politics empirically. 
4.1 Requirements for an acceptable method 
To take a systematic look at different methods, I have drawn up three criteria by which they 
may be evaluated.  For a method to be well suited for the use I intend it must meet all of these 
three criteria as well as possible:  
I. Acceptability - Must be a method that a large portion of empirically-oriented political 
scientists are willing to accept.  
II. Completeness - Must be a method that is consistent with theory of deliberation. 
III. Usefulness - Must be a method that is suitable for comparative analysis, preferably on 
a large scale and with a multitude of institutional arrangements. 
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A method that scores poorly on either of these criteria will be insufficient to provide 
evidence for either proving or disproving theories about deliberation in such a way that we can 
reasonably expect general political science to accept it.  
I will now proceed to elaborate and justify each of these criteria before discussing a number 
of possible methods that appear to be likely candidates for satisfying them. 
4.1.1 Acceptability 
Empirically-oriented naturalism has grown into a very strong ideal for political science. 
Eriksen and Weigård (1999:79) describe it as following a two world paradigm consisting of an 
objective world of generally accessible phenomena giving themselves to rational analysis and a 
subjective world of irrational feelings, values, whims and fancies outside the systematic world 
that can be analyzed scientifically. Within this two world paradigm, deliberation has belonged to 
the second, and has therefore been considered inconsequential to the majority of political 
scientists.  
Some deliberative theorists have responded to the lack of interest from the political science 
“mainstream” by ignoring the concerns of empirically-oriented scientists rather than trying to 
address them. The purpose of any normative position is of course to gain acceptance, and to 
achieve that goal, it seems less than productive to distance oneself from the majority of political 
scientists. 
To be acceptable to the political science community at large, we must find a method that 
conforms as much as possible to the most commonly accepted standards of the political science 
profession. Jonathon Moses and Torbjørn Knutsen (2007:50) identify these as based on the 
ontology of independent particulars, the epistemology of the correspondence theory of truth and 
a methodological focus on identifying patterns of regularity. Arendt Lijphart has in turn 
identified a hierarchy of methods organized in descending order of usefulness to the naturalist 
political scientist (Moses and Knutsen 2007:52): 
1. Experimental methods; 
2. Statistical methods; 
3. Comparative methods; and 
4. Case-study methods.   
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A key concern of naturalist political science is also that dependence on the subjective 
viewpoint of the researcher should be counteracted by sufficient replicability. The legitimacy of 
the work stems not from the logic of its arguments alone, but from the possibility of other 
researchers repeating the research to uncover errors in the application of methods with resulting 
lack of validity. An acceptable method should therefore allow other researchers to replicate the 
process, either with the same data or with a new set. 
According to Lijphart’s hierarchy, an experimental or statistical method would appear to best 
satisfy this criterion. 
4.1.2 Theoretical completeness 
The second criterion regards the connection to political theory. To bridge the gap between 
the empirically and theoretically oriented branches of political science, this bridge must have 
sufficiently strong foundations at both ends. Various methods may have larger appeal to one of 
the sides, but the method chosen must both adhere sufficiently to the methodological strictures of 
empirical political science as well as rest on a basis of political theory that is sufficiently 
complete. 
I recognize, along with Steiner et al. (Steiner et al. 2004:53) that the occasionally conflicting 
definitions and theories of deliberative democracy would not only make it unlikely, but 
theoretically impossible, to find an empirical method of investigation that would be consistent 
with the entire range of deliberative theories; at least if one should find one simple enough to be 
of practical use. The requirement for the ideally theoretically consistent method would therefore 
have to be a method that captures the entirety of a single strand of deliberative theory. The 
method should open every theoretically significant aspect of that theory for examination, 
preferably coinciding as much as possible with other theories. The minimum requirement of any 
method chosen is however that it has a sufficiently strong theoretical basis to be said to cover the 
essential characteristics of any single theory of deliberation. 
One example of such a theory that may be operationalized into a research method is Jürgen 
Habermas’ Discourse Ethics, as attempted by Steiner et al. in their Discourse Quality Index, and 
Lincoln Dahlberg (2002) in his research on the public sphere on the internet.    
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In the abovementioned article by Dahlberg (2002:31), he expresses concern about the 
theoretical completeness in current methods for research on deliberation, especially attempts to 
operationalize Habermas’ discourse ethics: 
The fundamental problem is that operationalization requires researchers to focus upon those aspects of the 
public sphere for which narrowly defined and measurable indicators can be found, thus neglecting other 
aspects less amenable to quantification. The result is a serious loss of meaning. The best we can hope for is 
a limited and skewed (because some aspects are more measurable than others) understanding of the extent 
that the communicative practices under investigation fill the public sphere conception. 
Dahlberg is especially concerned that reflexivity and sincerity, as criteria for good 
deliberation, are particularly likely to be left out because they are very difficult to observe and 
capture accurately. Whether someone is allowed to participate or treated with respect is much 
more readily observable in a debate than whether or not participants speak truthfully and really 
believe in what they are saying. A number of deliberative theorists have voiced similar concerns 
(Bächtiger and Steiner 2005:162-4; King 2009; O’Brien 2009). 
4.1.3 Usefulness 
The third criterion regards the usefulness of the method in performing practical research. To 
identify the factors conducive to deliberation, the method should be easily applicable to 
comparative analysis, both with low-N strategies such as the method of difference, but also with 
high-N methods such as the method of concomitant variations (Moses and Knutsen 2007:94-
115). 
In order to study deliberation as a general phenomenon, and especially to single out separate 
factors that promote or counteract it, we need to be able to study deliberation in various contexts. 
It is therefore preferable that we find a method that allows for comparison of debates that are 
different in nature. Preferably the same method should apply with equal ease to parliamentary 
debates through civil society organizations to kitchen table conversation. Steiner et al. (2004:53-
4) speak of this as the empirical power of the method. They find it important that it relies on 
observable phenomena in order to achieve sufficient reliability. When interpretation is necessary, 
as is the case with coding qualitative data, it is a great advantage to have precise and sufficiently 
clear instructions available. This could make it possible for different coders to employ the same 
method to different sets of data and produce comparable results. The usefulness of any data 
gathered, and the likelihood of being able to draw authoritative conclusions increases with the 
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amount of data one has access to. Standardized and comparable data lay the groundwork for new 
research and the advancement of the field as a whole. 
4.2 Potential methods 
I will now examine four methods that have all been suggested for the empirical study of 
deliberative politics. This is surely not a comprehensive list of possible approaches, but it is a 
selection of methods that appear to show particular promise. The first method, Grice’s Maxims, 
is a very well tried and developed method from language studies; the second and fourth, Speech 
Act Analysis and the Discourse Quality Index, are methods used by political scientists that have 
seen application on similar topics to the one at hand; Pragma-Dialectics, the third method 
presented, has not to my knowledge been put to extensive practical tests, but bears considering 
on account of its novel approach.  
4.2.1 Grice’s maxims 
The first method I will examine is based on the tradition of language studies. This is an 
important origin for much of the theory of deliberation. A core theorist of language and 
communication studies is H. Paul Grice (1975:45-7), who has established a list of maxims for 
good and effective communication. These have been employed by researchers of that discipline 
as an analytical tool, and bear much similarity to Habermas’ maxims of formal pragmatics, for 
example as discussed by Eriksen and Weigård (1999:54-6). These maxims amount to a form of 
social contract between people involved in discourse, forming norms of expression.  
As basis for a research method, these maxims have been employed more or less directly by 
analyzing and counting violations in real debates. Behaviour that deviates from Grice’s norms 
might be seen as behaviour detrimental to deliberation. Measuring the amount of such “rule-
breaking” is thus a possible avenue to determine the quality of deliberation (Krogstad 1999:202-
5; Skedsmo 2007).  
Social anthropologist Anne Krogstad (1999:202-29) is among the researchers who introduced 
this method into social science, through a connection to gender research, for an analysis of the 
behaviour of politicians in televised debates. She uses this to distinguishing between issue-
oriented and image-oriented behaviour. In the case of televised debates over EU referendums, 
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the analyzed types of violations were: “Long-windedness, credit-claiming, performance, question 
evasion and negative attention towards fellow debaters” (Krogstad 2001:157). 
4.2.1.1 Description 
Krogstad draws upon the work of gender studies researcher Karen Gomard in her 
operationalization of Grice’s maxims (Krogstad 1999:203, my translation): 
1. Quantity: Say only what is necessary according to the purpose of the conversation. 
2. Quality: Be honest. Say only what is true and not what you lack sufficient evidence 
for. 
3. Expression: Express yourself in a precise and direct manner without ambiguity and 
circumspectness. 
4. Relations: Be relevant. 
5. Sociality: Be polite. 
The fifth category is introduced by Krogstad herself in addition to Grice’s original four. She 
defends this by reference to the fact that Grice himself touches upon this subject in his text, 
although he fails to include it in his final list of maxims (Krogstad 1999:203-4). 
On the basis of these five categories of maxims, Krogstad identifies five breaches that are 
selected as particularly interesting to her research. It is important to note that her principal focus 
is the separation between issue and case orientation in televised debates, so it might be necessary 
to select other breaches as the most important in an analysis oriented towards analyzing the level 
of deliberation. Her five breaches are (Krogstad 1999:203, my translation): 
1. Width 
2. Self-promotion 
3. Rhetorical embellishment 
4. Evasion of questions 
5. Attacks on opponents 
The first breach may not appear to be self-explanatory. What is meant by this is arguments, 
digressions and examples that move outside of the context of the current debate, attempting to 
connect it to wider phenomena than the one in question (Krogstad 1999:203, 205-14).  
4.2.1.2 Strengths and weaknesses 
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Grice’s maxims are rooted in linguistic theory, and are based directly on a consistent set of 
theories within that discipline. I am however mostly concerned with deliberative politics. The 
questions should therefore be to what degree they comply with deliberative theory. Habermas 
(2005:385-6) himself has commented on this. He refers to it as an example of “philosophical 
reconstructions of basic competences.” His satisfaction for this method seems to be only partial, 
as he claims to “prefer a stronger conception of ‘rational discourse’ for explaining an epistemic 
notion of deliberative politics.” He appears to be concerned that this kind of approach only 
considers the veneer of potentially deliberative politics without delving into the truth behind the 
words. Thus we seem to be returning to the question of the criterion of truthfulness that was 
touched upon in chapter 4.1.2. On these grounds, we can consider the method to be fairly well 
grounded in theory, but not wholly theoretically complete. This reservation is more or less the 
same as one which will be brought up in chapter 4.2.4 regarding the Discourse Quality Index. 
I consider this method to be on a reasonable level when it comes to the acceptability 
criterion. Its main strength lies in the easily quantifiable nature of the data. Counting the numbers 
of breaches one can, as in Krogstad’s research, show the percentages of breaches they commit, 
and what kind of breaches these are (Krogstad 1999:218). These could, given sufficient amounts 
of data be subject to statistical analysis. The weakness in this regard must be the evaluative 
nature of the research. The researcher must do an evaluation of what constitutes breaches, which 
in turns requires an amount of background knowledge about the context and practices of the 
subject body that is studied. Replicability could be strengthened by very explicit evaluation 
criteria. 
In terms of usefulness, the method has clear strengths. As noted regarding the acceptability, 
the method lends itself rather easily to statistical analysis, which would make it well suited for 
concomitant variation comparisons. It is not as information-rich as some other methods, but its 
simplicity makes generating larger quantities of data much easier than with the more thorough 
qualitative analysis or more complex systems of coding and indices. 
4.2.2 Speech act analysis 
Katharina Holzinger (2005) has made another important contribution to the empirical study 
of deliberative politics through her analysis of conflict modes in legislative debate. 
Differentiating between arguing and bargaining as mode of conflict resolution, she has used 
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speech act analysis to discover which is more prevalent in two cases of German legislative 
debate. The method holds promise to discover which type of institutional factors further the one 
type over the other. 
By Holzinger’s (2005:241) own claim, her work is the first application of this method in the 
field of political science. It is also of linguistic origin, based on the work of John L. Austin and 
John R. Searle in the 1960s. Like pragma-dialectics and Habermas’ theory, it is based on 
pragmatics, the study not of the actual utterances5, but what is meant by them. 
The distinction between arguing and bargaining as modes of communication can be traced 
back to the work of Jon Elster, who introduces these two terms to differentiate between ideal 
types of behaviour associated with the metaphorical forum and marketplace respectively. In 
Elster’s work these two are part of the trichotomy of arguing, bargaining and voting as the three 
usual forms of decision in a modern society. He claims that political decision processes usually 
consist of all these three to a varying degree, but that arguing is the part that belongs to the 
deliberative (Elster 1998b:5-12; Holzinger 2005:240). The claim that bargaining and voting 
cannot be part of deliberation remains contested among deliberative theorists, among others by 
Habermas (2005:387-8) in direct response to Holzinger’s work. 
The method is in many ways similar to the method based on Grice’s maxims as discussed in 
chapter 4.2.1, but there are some significant differences. These will be explored in chapter 
4.2.2.2. 
Cornelia Ulbert and Thomas Risse (2005) have also conducted studies in deliberative politics 
based on this method, but this review is based first and foremost on Holzinger’s implementation 
as her objective is directly related to determining the level of deliberation in legislative debate. 
4.2.2.1 Description 
As previously noted, speech act analysis is rooted in linguistic studies, where it is a common 
part of the methodical repertoire. In our current context Holzinger is first and foremost 
concerned with so-called illocutionary acts, the pragmatic action the speaker performs by the 
utterance of words, the effect he intends to make. Different illocutionary acts have a set of 
requirements or rules they must satisfy in order to qualify as such, namely (1) what can be said, 
                                                 
5
 The study of the actual utterances, focused on words and phrases is called semantics. Insight into the 
semantics of a statement is presupposed for pragmatic study (Holzinger 2005:241). 
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(2) what social preconditions must apply, (3) what one must assume the speaker’s motivation to 
be and (4) what the action consists of (Holzinger 2005:241-2). 
Holzinger defines a number of illocutionary acts associated with bargaining and arguing 
respectively. Bargaining acts may be such as to demand, to offer, to promise or refuse, while to 
claim, assume, ask, justify and conclude are examples of arguing acts. Some acts may be either 
bargaining or arguing, for example to ascertain non-agreement or to reject and must be analyzed 
in their propositional context to be classified (Holzinger 2005:241-4). 
4.2.2.2 Strengths and weaknesses 
The theoretical completeness of the method in terms of deliberative theory appears to be 
rooted firmly in Elster’s deliberative theory and his decision trichotomy. Without access to the 
actual constitutive rules used by Holzinger in defining the illocutionary acts, it is difficult to 
ascertain to what extent she has captured the other important constituents of Elster’s work, for 
example the trichotomy of motives (Elster 1998b:6). I can only assume that such concerns have 
been dealt with properly. 
However, a more pressing matter is the critique of the application of speech act analysis in 
the first place. Ulbert and Risse (2005:363) themselves argue that analyzing the mere 
quantitative distributions of such acts in fact gives us very shaky grounds on which to draw 
conclusions about deliberativeness. It is also impossible to ascertain on these grounds whether 
actors are motivated by strategic interest or argumentative rationality in presenting the arguments 
they do. This appears similar to the earlier mentioned reservations in chapter 4.1.2 by Lincoln 
Dahlberg and others about the difficulty of measuring sincerity in political debate. Curato 
(2008:7) presents this as a common critique against the whole theory of discourse analysis, that it 
merely counts words, thereby ignoring the importance of the statement for the resolution of the 
argument as a whole. 
A more conclusive strength of the method lies in its easy quantification and clear rules of 
classification that provides both robust reliability of the results and possibilities for replication. 
This makes the method comply much better with the requirements of the acceptability criterion 
than for example the pragma-dialectic method. This also provides good opportunities for 
comparing results by different researchers. The method also appears to be relatively less work-
intensive than the pragma-dialectic method, further increasing the possibility of being able to use 
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it to conduct large N research. This should make the method more compliant with the 
acceptability and usefulness criteria. 
The clear classification criteria that constitutes the method also appears to be its major 
strength over the Grice-method described in chapter 4.2. An exercise of personal judgement on 
behalf of the researcher is still necessary, but this judgement is done within very explicit 
strictures, which would be likely to appeal more to naturalist political scientists than the more 
open application of the Grice maxims. The theoretical base in the social scientific theory of Jon 
Elster, explicitly linked to deliberation, should also serve to underline the relevance of its 
application to studies of deliberative politics. 
4.2.3 Pragma-dialectics 
The third method I will examine, Pragma-dialectics, has been proposed by Nicole Curato 
(2008) as a method that is well-suited for the study of deliberation. It may be said to be a return 
to the linguistic theory that is the basis of Habermas’ theories of deliberation. Far from being the 
only basis of deliberative theory, as some authors appear to suggest, Habermas’ discourse ethics 
is among the most comprehensive and widely cited deliberative theories. It is also the work to 
which Steiner et al. ascribe much of their work. As Curato (2008:8) points out, even if it is 
among the most cited theories, it is still rare to see empirical work actually based on the 
linguistic theory it is grounded in. 
Using pragma-dialectics as a method for researching deliberative practice is Curato’s 
proposed remedy for this. Pragma-dialectics is based on the work of Franz H. VanEemeren and 
Rob Grootendorst, with its theoretical roots in discourse analysis. It is oriented towards studying 
discussion as an attempt at resolving differences of opinion through reasoned discussion. As 
Habermas’ theories, it builds on linguistic theory and sets out a series of norms one can expect to 
be followed in reasoned discussion. The extent to which these norms are followed in actual 
practice becomes the basis on which one can evaluate the deliberativeness of a particular 
discussion (2008:1). 
The pragma-dialectical method bases itself on the analyst’s own interpretations of the 
essentials of arguments. This requires much knowledge about the context and the speakers in 
order to make correct interpretations. It is sensitive to the fact that mere interpretation is 
inadequate for systematic scientific research. The authors separate interpretation from analysis, 
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where the latter is interpretation through the goggles of an a priori assumed theoretical point of 
view. It is therefore essential that the analyst also has good working knowledge of the theories 
behind the method to be able to apply them correctly at all times (Van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst 2003:73-4). 
4.2.3.1 Description 
The method depends on regarding a series of speech acts as a whole, and analyzing the 
conflict resolution in stages. The first process in this is reconstruction of the discourse into an 
order that conforms with the pragma-dialectical ideal model of interaction. This involves four 
steps. 
The first is deletion of all parts of the discourse that is not relevant to the particular 
disagreement to be studied.  This may include deleting whole or parts of speech acts. The second 
is addition of relevant parts of the discourse that are deemed to be implicit. Well reasoned 
additions based on the knowledge of the analyst are important to present the discourse as a whole 
that can be analyzed. The third is the substitution of confusingly ambiguous or vague statements 
with clear statements that express the unequivocal relevance of the argument to the discourse at 
hand. The final step is the permutation of the text so that the various speech acts are arranged in 
the order that clearly brings out their relevance in the various stages of the ideal model of 
interaction (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2003:95-110).  
In this process, the principles to be applied are those of maximally reasonable reconstruction 
and maximally argumentative interpretation. These two principles imply that one is to construct 
the dialogue in such a way as to give the speaker maximum credit possible for contribution to the 
resolution of the conflict, and when there is reason to doubt the communicative function of a 
statement, it shall be considered to be argumentative in nature (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
2003:114-17). 
Relevant speech acts in a critical discussion are assertives, directives, commissives and 
declaratives. Discussion moves from a confrontation stage through an opening stage, into an 
argumentation stage and finally a conclusion stage. Each of these has acceptable rules of speech, 
regulating what types of speech acts are considered acceptable. Most important for the study of 
deliberation will be the argumentation stage, in which the heart of the discussion ensues. In this 
stage, the only acceptable speech acts are those of argumentation by way of an assertive, 
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acceptance (or denial) of such an assertive by way of a commissive, or a request of further 
argumentation in order to be able to potentially accept the position of the protagonist (Curato 
2008:10-14). 
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2002:182-3) forward a list of ten commandments that any 
discussant must follow in order to engage in proper critical discussion. With these ten normative 
criteria there are in turn associated a total of 34 breaches or fallacies that are considered contrary 
to proper critical discussion. Based on these it becomes possible to devise a coding scheme that 
might measure the degree of deliberation in a debate through the interaction between speech acts 
rather than the reductionist study of each speech act separately. The theory does not allow for 
coding of every separate speech act, but at the level of a single debate it becomes possible to 
measure a degree of deliberation (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992:212-7). 
4.2.3.2 Strengths and weaknesses 
The main strength of the method for the study of deliberative politics must be said to be its 
theoretical completeness, as demonstrated by Curato (2008:8-10). It can be said to be a faithful 
adaptation of Habermas’ theoretical foundations, most importantly his universal pragmatics. 
Habermas’ project may be said to be incomplete as it doesn’t give directions for how 
deliberation may be studied in the real world. The pragma-dialectical method shows how this can 
be achieved in practice without compromising the theory. 
My most important concern about this method when it comes to theoretical completeness is 
its strong reliance on formal logic and associated fallacies. Embedded in the method is the 
assumption that discussion can only be deliberative when conducted by correct application of 
argumentation schemes and logical models. When applied to deliberative politics, this would 
mean that logically invalid arguments would have to be considered non-deliberative behaviour 
regardless of the nature of, and reason for the logical breach. This is problematic if the essence of 
what one wants to study is the participants’ devotion to the ideals of deliberation and the level of 
their attempts at following these rather than their rhetorical and logical skills. I consider it 
possible to make a deliberative argument that is logically invalid. In fact, it may be considered a 
very important part of the deliberative process itself to discover and address logical fallacies in 
argumentation as a way of reaching the best possible conclusions of the debate. Uncovering a 
logical fallacy in the arguments of the opposition may be the best tool available to convince them 
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that your position is better justified; a true application of the “forceless force of the better 
argument”. Pragma-dialectics – designed more to identify efficient discussion than actual 
deliberativeness – excludes this, which may be considered a validity error.  
This is an instance of not separating the amount and quality of deliberation as Lascher 
prescribes. If we consider these to be substantially different concepts which we can expect to be 
affected differently by institutional and other influential factors or affecting outcomes differently, 
then any method that doesn’t make such distinctions becomes less satisfactory. 
Compliance with the acceptability criterion must be considered to be this model’s primary 
weakness. It is a qualitative method, based on linguistic theory that does not lend itself very 
smoothly to quantification. This might be considered a weakness by many political scientists. A 
greater problem is however the amount and level of personal judgment that must be exercised by 
the analyst. Not only is it necessary to correctly interpret statements, but the model also requires 
the addition of implicit statements and the subtraction of irrelevant clauses. Furthermore, one 
should rearrange statements in order to create as complete a statement as possible. All in all this 
amounts to a large amount of editing of the data that is not very easily documented, heavily 
impairing the possibility of replication of the research. I do not claim that extensive 
documentation of the additions, subtractions and permutations would be impossible, but 
complete documentation would be so work-intensive as to seriously reduce the amount of data it 
is possible to process through a method like this. 
Without extensive collaboration between researchers in order to harmonize the experiences 
and foreknowledge drawn upon to make the interpretations of statements it would also be very 
difficult to directly compare analyses conducted by different researchers, further reducing the 
usefulness of the method. 
Within the research tradition of linguistics, from which the model originates, neither of these 
objections are very problematic. When the goal is acceptance within political science, I do 
however find it very unlikely that this model could be deemed satisfactory. 
4.2.4 Discourse Quality Index (DQI) 
The DQI is the result of an extensive research project on parliamentary debate run by Jürg 
Steiner and André Bächtiger based out of the Bern Center of Interdisciplinary Deliberation 
Studies at the Bern University in Switzerland. The most thorough presentation of the method and 
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their findings is presented in the book Deliberative Politics in Action. Analysing Parliamentary 
Discourse (Steiner et al. 2004). The project is concerned both with analyzing the antecedents that 
are beneficial to deliberation and the substantive outcomes of a high level of deliberation. 
They also outline four criteria that are the basis of their quest for a method: “(1) it should be 
theoretically grounded, (2) it should tap into observable phenomena, (3) it should be general, and 
(4) it should be reliable” (Steiner et al. 2004:53). These criteria correspond reasonably well to the 
requirements I have laid out. (2) and (4) are important for my requirement I, (1) corresponds 
more or less directly with my III, and (3) and (4) together are important for fulfilling my 
requirement II. How well the DQI method actually corresponds to these criteria remains a matter 
for discussion. 
4.2.4.1 Description 
The method bases itself on Habermas’ theories of communicative action, especially his 
conception of discourse ethics (Habermas 1996[1992]), but the authors also draw extensively on 
the work of John S. Dryzek (2000), Lucio Baccaro (2001),  Amy Gutmann and Dennis 
Thompson (2003) and others (Steiner et al. 2004:16-27). 
The approach is based on breaking a debate down into separate speech act, based on the idea 
that each individual act can be evaluated on a continuum between being ideally deliberative and 
completely non-deliberative in character. A theoretical choice is made to focus on demands, 
coding only speech acts or parts thereof that concern actual demands for action that should or 
should not be taken. This is explained such: 
Our emphasis on demands stems from the fact that they constitute the heart of the deliberation. That is, 
demands stipulate what ought to be done and what ought not to be done, and this normative character puts 
them at the center of discourse ethics (Steiner et al. 2004:55). 
The speech acts considered relevant by this measure are coded according to a set of objective 
criteria to allow for quantitative analysis (Steiner et al. 2004:170-9). They use different versions 
of the DQI, depending on which criteria are considered the most relevant. The most used variant, 
the DQI-3 focuses on the indicators of respect, levels of justification and constructive politics 
(Steiner et al. 2004:149). The DQI-4 variant also includes the indicator content of justification. 
The respect indicator is broken down into three separate categories, respect for groups to be 
helped, respect for demands of others and respect for counterarguments.  
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In particular, respect towards the demands of others is considered by Steiner et al. to be an 
indicator of deliberation rather than bargaining. In a pure bargaining situation, they argue that 
opponents’ demands need only be accepted, with no need to explicitly value them. In a 
deliberative situation, on the other hand, reciprocity demands that one is willing to “concede the 
point” when the opposition presents valid and relevant arguments for their cause (Steiner et al. 
2004:58-9). 
The level of justification concerns to what degree and with what level of sophistication a 
participant presents justifications for his demands. The difference between an inferior and 
qualified justification is that proper linkages between demand and arguments are given, while a 
sophisticated justification consists of several reasons either for the same or different demands. 
No particular reason is given as to why presenting one reason each for two separate demands is a 
more sophisticated justification when presented in one speech act rather than when divided into 
two separate ones (Steiner et al. 2004:57). 
The constructive politics indicator measures whether the speaker is sitting on a previously 
announced position, or whether he is fielding new proposals. Whether these proposals are 
attempts at mediation or proposals to a different agenda is noted (Steiner et al. 2004:59-60). 
The content of justification indicator concerns whether arguments are about the common 
good or group interests. Explicit references to the common good, either in terms of the difference 
principle or utilitarian arguments are indicators of high deliberative quality, while explicit 
references to group interest count negatively (Steiner et al. 2004:58). 
4.2.4.2 Strengths and weaknesses 
This method is a clear compromise between the three criteria outlined in section 4.1. The 
method keeps much of the quantitative acceptability of speech act analysis as employed by 
Holzinger while adding complexity that increases the theoretical completeness. The creation of a 
scale also makes for excellent usefulness for both high and low N comparative analysis. 
As pointed out earlier, the method has a thorough theoretical basis in Habermas’ discourse 
ethics with added justification from a wide array of contemporary deliberative theorists. Still it 
fails to resolve the concern voiced by Dahlberg (2002:31) and others about the ability to tap into 
the less observable criteria, especially the truthfulness criterion.  
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To maintain focus on observable phenomena, thus retaining acceptability, the developers 
make a pragmatic choice in this case due to the difficulty of finding a measure of this 
characteristic (Bächtiger et al. 2005:232; Steiner et al. 2004:56). They focus on observable 
indicators that can presumably be classified through objective standards. Where they run into 
difficulty with applying sufficiently objective criteria, they consistently choose to avoid having 
to pass individual judgement by “erring on the side of pessimism” (Steiner et al. 2004:142) or 
leaving the parameter out, as is the case with the truthfulness requirement. This carries the 
advantage of being able to claim objectivity, but weakens the theoretical completeness. 
In a recently published assessment of the method, Laura O’Brien (2009:6-7) also makes the 
point about the theoretical incompleteness resulting from the omission of the sincerity criterion 
from the DQI. This is not allowed to overshadow its positives sides, and leads her to a positive 
conclusion about the way in which the DQI implements Habermas’ theory. In the same journal 
issue, Martin King (2009:4) is less forgiving, claiming “[…]that Steenbergen et al’s attempt to 
operationalize the theory produces conceptions that distort, reduce and omit vital notions of the ideals 
it aims to measure”. Although the former critic fails to draw the necessary conclusions of her 
observations and the latter appears to discard the entire method based on a shaky methodological 
basis, they both highlight the major problem resulting from the omission of factors that are among 
the most important to Habermas’ work. 
Another potential methodological reservation is the choice to analyze deliberation in a 
thoroughly reductionist fashion. Speech acts are considered completely isolated from each other 
and the average of the scores of all speeches represent the total DQI score for the debate. The 
interplay between arguments is only captured to a limited degree through the “respect toward 
counterargument” indicator (Steiner et al. 2004:58-9,177-8) where explicit mentions of 
counterarguments are considered. This very strong reductionism raises some issues about the 
understanding of the interplay between speech acts that is a natural part of deliberation, clearly 
being a weakness compared for example to the more qualitative Pragma-dialectic method. 
4.3 Conclusions on method choice 
The discussion in section 4.2 through may be schematically summed up as follows: 
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Table 1: Overview of methods 
 Acceptability Usefulness Theoretical 
completeness 
Grice’s maxims Reasonable. Relies on 
linguistic interpretation 
but with clear criteria. 
Fairly good. Easily 
quantifiable. 
Somewhat lacking. 
Consistent, but does not 
cut deep enough. 
Speech act analysis Fairly good. Depends 
on objective criteria for 
coding. 
Fairly good. Easily 
quantifiable and 
comparable. 
Somewhat lacking. 
Depends on defining 
deliberation by arguing 
and bargaining. 
Pragma-dialectics Low. Relies heavily on 
subjective 
interpretations and 
transformations. 
Somewhat lacking. 
Work intensive and. 
Difficult to compare 
cases. 
Good. Mostly consistent 
with Habermas’ theory. 
Discourse Quality 
Index 
Fairly good. Attempts 
to minimize subjective 
judgement. 
Very good. Quantitative 
index. 
Reasonable. Consistent 
but some weaknesses. 
 
The Pragma-dialectic method stands out as the method most theoretically complete. This is 
not unexpected given the clearly qualitative bias research in this field has had so far. This 
method does however stand out as the weakest on acceptability. Both the Grice maxim method 
and Speech act analysis appear to be within reasonable limits on the acceptability and usefulness 
criteria, but don’t have sufficient theoretical completeness. The Discourse Quality Index, despite 
some serious theoretical reservations appears to be the only method among the four that 
conforms to all three criteria on a reasonable level. 
Another great advantage to this method over the others is that it has been developed for just 
the kind of research I aim to do, so it requires little adaptation in order to be applicable. The 
research team behind it also deserve credit for their open access view towards research, having 
published extensive notes on their research both in the form of a book and on their project web 
page (Bern Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of Deliberation 2007a; Steiner et al. 2004). 
5 A test study of factions and deliberation 
As established in the previous section, the Discourse Quality Index appears to be the most 
adequate method developed for empirical study of deliberation. To gain further experience with 
the model and its usefulness for studying the relationship between factions in politics and 
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deliberative discourse, I conducted a study on two Norwegian representative bodies. As the goal 
is to prepare the ground for future congruence case studies, I selected two bodies that were as 
similar to parliamentary politics as possible, but of which at least one had no organized political 
factions. This was found in the student parliaments of the University of Oslo and the Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology in Trondheim. 
The test study shows little identifiable difference between the two parliaments in terms of 
deliberativeness. The main reason for this may be an insufficient quantity and width of data for 
the analysis. Thus few, if any, conclusions can be drawn about empirical concurrence and 
causality on the basis of this study. The study does however demonstrate that the Discourse 
Quality Index may be applied to such research, while raising a few further questions and 
suggestions for possible refinement. 
5.1 Research design 
The study was conducted by examining one student parliament with an institutionalized 
system of political factions and one without. As they share most other characteristics other than 
this, a significant difference in the level of deliberation can most likely be explained by the effect 
of political factions. This following the method called a difference case study, analyzing the 
differences in otherwise similar cases (Moses and Knutsen 2007:98-100). 
5.1.1 Case selection 
Following the original sampling principle of Steiner et al.’s (2004:99-100) DQI research, I 
have relied on theoretical (or typological) sampling for the case comparison. This means 
selecting cases according to theoretically-based expectations, filling a set of categories. 
Originally developed for qualitative case studies, there seems to be little ground why it should 
not also be applicable to quantitative analysis for the purpose of examining theoretical 
assumptions. Along with Steiner et al. (2004:100), I consider a typological sample an 
indispensable precursor to later large scale research in order to produce results with possibilities 
of statistical generalization. 
In this case the categories are with and without the presence of formalized factions. This is an 
example of a deductive typological theory. I start with a deductive theoretical assumption about 
causality: that deliberation in a body with formalized factions will be less likely to be 
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deliberative than a body without. The important independent variable in this case is the 
dichotomous variable “presence of formalized factions” which can be reduced into two types: 
with and without (George and Bennett 2005:244-8). Further following J.S. Mill’s method of 
difference, I then try to find cases that are as similar as possible, yet still may be placed in the 
different typological categories. I can of course not guarantee that there are other characteristics 
of the two bodies that account for any difference that may be encountered, but I account as well 
as possible for the important factors indicated in other research (Moses and Knutsen 2007:98-
100; Steiner et al. 2004:100-3). 
The theoretical sampling categorization has primarily been on the institutional level, 
selecting two institutions that fit the theoretical categories and are as similar as possible in other 
respects. The original study of antecedents by Steiner et al. also had a typologically selected 
sample of 52 parliament debates (Steiner et al. 2004:104).  
An alternative sampling strategy would have been to look at a variety of democratic 
assemblies without political parties, as for example found in different civil organizations. This is 
a viable strategy for further research in the area, but it would be a much more complex study 
requiring a sample much beyond the feasible in this project. 
The debate sampling has also been subject to the constraint of availability. The limited 
number of sessions to choose from within the project period, as well as the available resources, 
forced me to choose just two sessions from each parliament. At the parliament at the University 
of Oslo, I chose the only two meetings within the project period. At NTNU I chose the two 
meetings in which I anticipated the most real political debate according to the scheduled case 
load. I avoided meetings with a large number of elections, as these are by convention conducted 
without plenary debate in both parliaments. Within these four meetings, time, economic and 
manpower constraints have limited me to a study of 6 debates, containing 200 relevant speeches. 
The analyzed debates were selected through a process of elimination in which purely procedural 
debates or proceedings where no specific proposal for action was debated were removed. In 
addition, debates with no substantial counter-proposal to the original proposal were also 
eliminated. This left 4 debates at the University of Oslo that were selected. At NTNU there were 
3 potential debates, of which 2 were selected. The third was omitted because the amendments 
proposed to the proposal were so minor that there appeared to be little substantial disagreement 
over the proposal. With the number of coded speeches at NTNU already well exceeding the 
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number at UiO, I considered the likelihood that the last debate would change the significance of 
the outcomes as too unlikely to warrant coding. 
5.1.2 Data collection 
The material in Steiner’s research has been based on two kinds of sources. Where available, 
they have been coding on official transcripts from the proceedings. Where these are unavailable, 
for example in closed committee meetings, they have worked from own transcripts of sound 
recordings (Steiner 2008). As my chosen parliaments have no official transcripts, I have been 
forced to employ the latter method. 
The debates recorded were all part of open meetings by the Student Parliament of Oslo and 
the Student Parliament at NTNU. Recordings were done openly using an electronic recording 
device, thus requiring no particular permission other than the consent of the meeting leadership. 
All meeting participants were explicitly made aware of the recording and its intended purpose by 
me or the debate moderator. In one of the debates, I was myself asked to moderate the meeting. I 
am aware that this may be perceived as a possibility to influence the data. In meetings such as 
these, however, the role of the moderator is purely formal; his conduct is guided by very strict 
formal rules and informal norms. Deviation from these rules usually elicits very quick and 
decisive censure from experienced members and observers, and the actual possibility for the 
moderator to influence the debates beyond enforcing is very limited. As moderator in the debate, 
I was also very careful to take a conservative position in interfering with the debate. As a result 
the number of actual interventions by the moderator in order to enforce order was very low. For 
these reasons I believe the chance that I influenced the debate in ways that created distortions to 
be miniscule.  
5.2 The debates 
As mentioned in section 5.1.1, I selected four debates from the UiO and two from NTNU as 
the basis for the coding. Following is a qualitative description of each of these debates. 
5.2.1 The University of Oslo 
The general impression of the University of Oslo debates were that there was a less “harsh” 
debate climate than what I have experienced a few years earlier. The level of civility was clearly 
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higher. The character of the debates, and particularly the early closing of the speaker lists, gave 
the impression that the debates were less designed to be a forum for actual decision making and 
that participants had generally decided on their voting beforehand. There were even a couple of 
instances of clearly referring to how “we” as a group within the parliament were going to vote, 
clearly indicating that voting was decided in an internal discussion before the floor debate. 
5.2.1.1 Faculty of extra-faculty activity 
The first debate at UiO was conducted on March 26th 2009, as the continuation of a 
postponed debate from February 19th (Studentparlamentet i Oslo 2009) the same year. It 
concerned a proposal for an administrative reorganization, creating a separate university faculty 
for university research centres and other units that don’t fit within the established faculty and 
department structure at the university (Skipenes 2009:19).  
The main division line in the debate was whether or not the proposal needed to include a 
guarantee that each unit reorganized would retain both its academic autonomy and its level of 
funding. There were some clear examples of interest group arguments here, on behalf of units 
that would become part of the reorganization. Nevertheless, most speeches were still focused on 
finding solutions and the good of the university as a whole. 
5.2.1.2 Rector election 
The debate concerned whether or not the Student Parliament should take a clear stand on 
behalf of the student in the electoral campaign for becoming new university Rector. There were 
two candidates on election, and some members of the assembly had clear preferences one way or 
the other. The main debate was, however, reduced to whether or not either candidate should be 
supported. 
In this debate, the level of respect for opposing demands seemed markedly lower, but only in 
two speeches was it expressed so clearly it warranted being coded as such. These were however 
serious enough breaches of conduct so as to influence the mood of the entire debate, that 
appeared markedly more hostile than most of the other debates. 
5.2.1.3 Statute revisions 
The last debate coded was a debate in the Student Parliament over revisions of their statutes. 
A proposal was presented by the executive committee that contained several somewhat 
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controversial suggestions. The debate centred about two issues: What representation the local 
faculties should have in the parliament, and whether the students on the university board should 
be in full or part time positions.   
This debate was characterized by several instances of explicit disrespect towards the 
suggestions and demands of others. Proposals were several times described as “horrendously 
bad”, “silly” or with similar derogatives. 
5.2.2 NTNU 
The general impression from the NTNU debates is that they were more characterized by 
genuine deliberation. The way speeches are phrased and the way the debate is conducted clearly 
indicates that the delegates treat it as a debate forum in which real decisions are made and where 
the debate is expected to affect the outcome of the decision-making. 
5.2.2.1 Exam assessment 
The first coded debate at NTNU was regarding a proposed statement about the need for 
revisions of exam assessment procedures. In addition to several minor issues, conflicting 
demands were presented regarding the use of external assessors and whether exams should be 
graded by one or two assessors. The debate was significantly longer than either of the UiO 
debates, counting 83 relevant speeches.  
There were a few instances of group interest arguments and a few instances of clear 
disrespect towards the demand of others, clearly overstepping the boundaries of deliberative 
behaviour. Compared to the high number of speeches in the debate, such behaviour cannot be 
said to dominate the debate. Nevertheless, it seemed higher than the usual practice in the student 
parliament at NTNU. 
5.2.2.2 Budget priorities 
The other NTNU debate was about the students’ priorities for the university budget process, 
and counted a total of 50 relevant speeches. It was centred on a prioritized list of proposals from 
the executive committee, with several proposals for changes and amendments.  
The debate was more or less completely free of group interest arguments and had only a very 
few instances of disrespectful speeches. It clearly gave the impression of being the most 
deliberative of all the debates included. 
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5.2.3 Method 
Chapter 4 covers most of the process in selecting the method to use. A large number of 
methods were surveyed in order to find the method that showed the most promise according to 
the chosen research criteria. Although no method seems to be without serious weaknesses in this 
regard, Steiner et al.’s (2004) Discourse Quality Index appears to be the most completely 
developed model that complies with all the criteria to a reasonable degree. 
To test the practical application of the method to a slightly different type of setting than the 
parliament setting studied by Steiner et al., it was important to try and follow their method as 
faithfully as possible. The documentation relied upon is first and foremost the book Deliberative 
Politics in Action (Steiner et al. 2004), as well as further coding instructions and examples 
available through the web pages of the Bern Center for Interdisciplinary Deliberation Studies 
(2006; 2007b; c). Despite the effort to be as faithful as possible to the instructions of the original 
research, it became necessary to make a few adaptations in order for the codings to be 
meaningful in the context they are used here. 
Preliminary adaptations are described here, while I go into more details on the experiences 
with the practical application in section 5.4. 
5.2.3.1 Relevance 
The DQI specifications operate with a rather narrow definition of what constitutes a relevant 
speech act. To be relevant for the discourse in deliberative politics, it is necessary that the speech 
presents a clear demand to the agenda in question (Steiner et al. 2004:55). Speech acts such as 
clarifying questions or remarks unrelated to the debate are removed from the analysis. This 
appears to have been relatively unproblematic in the original research, but less so in the debates I 
analyse. A common practice of presenting oral proposals for discussion without formalizing 
them, and numerous amendments to many proposals, sometimes makes it challenging to identify 
the exact demand presented or supported by a particular speech act. I found it necessary to 
violate Steiner et al’s premise of “erring on the side of pessimism”, rather having to exercise my 
best judgement in discerning what demand a speech act relates to. In this work it proved 
necessary to consider all the contributions of a speaker in a particular debate in order to track his 
position and potential changes. I have therefore specified in shorthand for each speech what I 
have interpreted as its demand. Speeches have then been coded with a (0) not relevant, (1) 
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implicit demand or (2) explicit demand. Speeches that at first sight were obviously irrelevant 
have been left out of the coding altogether, while speeches that are coded with (0) on this 
indicator are left out of all subsequent analysis. The (1) and (2) scores are not actually included 
in the analysis, but retained for future reference. 
5.2.3.2 Participation 
This variable was coded exactly according to the coding instructions (Steiner et al. 
2004:171), coded as (1) unless a speaker explicitly stated that he or she was interrupted. Not a 
single instance of interruption was found in the material. 
Steiner et al. (2004:56-7) rely on a negative definition of participation. If a speaker is not 
directly prevented from participating, then participation is good. They assume this to be an 
unproblematic definition in formal debates, as participation is guaranteed by formally established 
rights. When one assumes participation as guaranteed, we can question whether or not it is a 
relevant indicator at all.  
5.2.3.3 Level of justification for demands 
The variable was coded as per the instructions in the original coding instructions (Steiner et 
al. 2004:171-3), with four categories: (0) no justification, (1) inferior justification, (2) qualified 
justification and (3) sophisticated justification. The later coding instructions (Bern Center for 
Interdisciplinary Studies of Deliberation 2006) specify a division of the latter category into 
“broad” and “wide” sophisticated justifications. As this was not part of the original work, and the 
original work makes no such distinction, I chose to keep the original coding. 
The coding instructions allow for the use of personal judgement in coding into categories (2) 
and (3) if implicit linkages between demand and reasons are sufficiently clear that the coder 
considers it beyond a reasonable doubt that it is understood by the other participants in the 
debate. It proved necessary to accept implied linkages to a large degree during the debates, 
especially as demands were often implicit themselves, as discussed in section 5.2.3.1. 
5.2.3.4 Content of justification for demands 
According to the coding instructions, this variable is coded in four categories, (0) explicit 
statement concerning constituency or group interest, (1) neutral statement, (2a) explicit statement  
of the common good in utilitarian or collective terms, (2b) explicit statement of the common 
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good in terms of the difference principle (Steiner et al. 2004:173-5). The distinction between 
types of common good arguments is not used in the rest of the original work, and the theoretical 
basis of the research gives little reason to assume that these are either more or less deliberative. 
Their effect on the DQI is still weighted the same, so I decided to omit the distinction for the 
sake of simplicity. 
An accurate description of what constitutes the “common good” proved a bit difficult in 
dealing with parliaments that in essence constitute an interest group at the university. In the 
issues discussed, both the interests of the university as a whole and the interests of the students as 
a whole could be at stake, and occasionally in conflict. This speech act presented in the UiO 
debate on the rector election (speech act #3), gives examples of both reasoning for the common 
good of the students and the common good of the university: 
I want to take this opportunity to say why I think Wyller is the best candidate to lead the university for the 
next four years […] He has presented this for us, and through his election platform given a clear and 
precise picture of what kind of visions he has, what he wants; a unitary idea of what he wants the university 
to be. […], but what is important to me is that Wyller has given a clear and precise signal that he will 
prioritize the students and that research where the students are will be prioritized.  
As the purpose of the parliaments is to represent the students, I found it meaningless to 
characterize a statement that opposed the good of the student to for example that of faculty 
members as non-deliberative. Thus I chose to code both arguments about the good of the 
university as a whole and arguments about the good of the students as a whole as statements of 
the common good. 
5.2.3.5 Respect indicators 
In the original coding instructions (Steiner et al. 2004:176-8), the two first respect indicators, 
towards the groups to be helped and the demands of others were coded on a scale of (0) to (2). 
These proved not to be very problematic and were coded as instructed. 
The last respect indicator, respect towards counterarguments, presents a larger problem. The 
instructions were for coding on a scale of (0) to (3). In the first two categories, a code of (0) was 
for explicit disrespect, (1) was a neutral speech act, while in this a code of (2) was given to an 
explicitly respectful act. In the instructions for this indicator, however, the indicator (0) was 
reserved for “counterarguments are ignored”. Steiner et al. give no justification in their work for 
why ignoring a counterargument is considered worse than explicitly degrading it, let alone why it 
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is exactly twice as bad6. Steiner et al. (Steiner et al. 2004:65-7) point out themselves that it is in 
reality two coding decisions: whether or not an argument is ignored and whether that argument is 
spoken of in positive or negative terms. 
In the 2006 instructions, they seem to have changed this practice. Now they code (0) for 
explicitly negative statements, (1) for ignoring arguments and (2) for neutral mention of 
arguments (Bern Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of Deliberation 2006). This seems to 
resolve the above-mentioned puzzle about the priorities between the codes. The same coding 
instructions also clarify that this should only be coded when a specific counterargument is voiced 
in response to a participant in a way that clearly warrants a response. This has been the basis for 
my coding decisions on these issues. 
With these problems in mind, I decided to code the third respect indicator in the same way as 
the others. A code of (0) was given for explicit disrespect of a counterargument or obviously 
deliberate misrepresentations and omissions. (1) was given for a neutral speech act, and (2) was 
given for a speech act that explicitly valued an argument presented for the opposite position in 
the debate. Speech acts for which no responses to counterarguments were given, and where this 
could not be clearly taken as an instance of ignoring counterarguments, were originally coded as 
(9) N/A. When creating the index, N/A codes were recoded to a (1), representing a neutral 
statement. The alternative would be to code the entire speech as a “system missing” case, losing 
valuable data on the other indicators. Simply calculating the index without this indicator would 
of course be tantamount to coding it as a (0), creating further distortions. 
The later versions of the coding instructions (Bern Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of 
Deliberation 2006; 2007b) include a further refinement of the respect indicator by introducing a 
new respect category, “respect by reference”. Rather than focus on respect towards the 
arguments of other participants, this focuses on respect for the speaker. It is coded only when 
other speakers refer to participants with a different position than their own. The indicator is 
scored with a (0) for no reference, (1) for personal or partisan attacks on other participants, (2) 
for a neutral reference to another participant and (3) for personal or partisan praise of another 
participant. In trying to keep consistency between the respect indicators, I decided to change the 
coding to the regular (0)-(2) scale, removing the “no reference” category and treating it as a (9) 
                                                 
6
 The difference between a neutral statement (2) and ignoring (0) is 2 points on the indicator, while the 
difference between a neutral response and degrading is (1) point. 
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N/A code. In composing the index the N/A result was recoded into (1), consistent with the 
reasoning regarding the counterarguments. 
5.2.3.6 Constructive politics 
The coding instructions on this category (Steiner et al. 2004:178-9) separates between speech 
acts in which the speaker sits on his position (0), presents an alternative proposal (1) or presents 
a mediating proposal (2). An “alternative proposal” is one in which the speaker outlines a 
proposal which is not part of the proposals currently discussed. A mediating proposal is a 
proposal in which the speaker moves from his previous position to suggest a proposal that might 
be more acceptable to the opposition.  
This typology depends on a very narrow conception of debate in which it is clearly 
discernible what constitutes a proposal and not. There is also no category for coding a proposal 
that goes beyond being “mediating”, one that in fact constitutes a real change of position. The 
reason this is not included in the coding scheme is presumably because it is near unthinkable in a 
regular parliament setting. This is of course an important indicator of deliberation, a vital 
component of which is “yielding to the forceless force of the better argument”. To account for 
this, I included a category (3) speaker explicitly adopts the proposal of the opposition.  
5.3 Conditions for deliberation in the two parliaments 
The research of Steiner et al. suggests four institutional arrangements that promote 
deliberation: consensus institutions, second chamber debate, veto players and non-public arenas 
(Steiner et al. 2004:98). As I will show here, the differences between the two bodies studied here 
are so small with respect to the DQI precedents that it seems reasonable to expect that they 
should cause little difference in expectations about the DQI score in the two parliaments. If a 
significant difference should be found, it would therefore appear to be an indication that Steiner 
et al.’s antecedents are insufficient to explain the variance. I offer a new hypothesis that might 
explain such differences based on the literature on political parties presented in chapter 3, that 
the existence of political parties (or similar organized factions) weaken deliberation. 
There is not much written documentation on the more informal practices of these two 
parliaments, and they have to my knowledge not been the subject of earlier structured research. 
Therefore, the evaluations herein rely to a large part on my own experiences. I have personal 
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experience with the practices of both parliaments through extensive involvement with student 
politics both at the local level at NTNU and at the national level through the Norwegian Union of 
Students (NSU). The latter has brought me in extensive contact with the student parliament at the 
University of Oslo. 
5.3.1 Consensus institutions 
Steiner et al. make use of Lijphart’s (1984) dichotomy of consensus and competitive 
democracies to separate different styles of democracy. This division has been very influential as 
an analytical tool in comparative politics (Steiner et al. 2004:79). 
Competitive democracies, also referred to as majoritarian democracies, are characterized by a 
system where everything is based on the decisions of the majority. The ruling party can safely 
disregard a parliamentary minority. Likewise, the opposition has very little incentive to 
cooperate with the government. When compromises and consensuses are reached, voters might 
give credit to the ruling party causing the opposition to lose votes at the next election. The 
opposition rather has incentives to destabilize and undermine the decisions of the government in 
order to prove their failure (Steiner et al. 2004:81-2). 
What Steiner et al. emphasize the most about consensus democracies is the existence of 
grand coalitions that both require internal deliberation in order to be able to make informed 
decisions, as well as weaken electoral competition. According to Steiner, politics becomes less of 
a zero-sum-game in such democracies, as other parties than the largest have good opportunities 
to influence politics. More diffuse processes of decision making also makes it more difficult for 
any single actor to claim political victories as his own, thereby reducing the value of the outcome 
for others. All these factors may be expected to increase the level of deliberation (Steiner et al. 
2004:79-80).  
Both parliaments discussed here appear to be more like consensus democracies than 
competitive. In the election of their executive committees and appointments to other important 
positions, they both practice some form of representational voting system7, ensuring that any 
sufficiently large minority is ensured representation.  
                                                 
7
 In Oslo: A Single transferrable vote system (Paulsen 2007:5.8 §10,§11). In Trondheim: A simplified 
proportionate voting system (Studenttinget NTNU 2008:§5.2). 
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The formalized factions in Oslo open the opportunity for minority groups to maximize their 
influence through negotiations. Through negotiated electoral cooperation, where positions and 
votes are exchanged between factions, they ensure that no majority is able to secure more 
positions of influence than the approximate proportions indicated by the election results. In the 
year studied here, the parliament president represented the radical left faction, while the vice 
president was a conservatively oriented non-partisan representative. 
In Trondheim, the absence of formalized factions makes the negotiation system practiced in 
Oslo all but impossible.  No representative is able to commit the votes of any other, and can thus 
not be effective at trading support for candidates. Still, a proportional voting ensures that if 
different special interests are represented, large minorities should be secured representation. 
Without negotiations, however, electoral competition between minorities may let a large 
coherent group seize a more than proportional share of positions compared to their number of 
parliament representatives. 
With the absence of identifiable factions that can take credit for decisions or be punished for 
ineffective government, the incentive for undermining the majority associated with competitive 
institutions seems absent in the NTNU system. That no such factions have arisen may also be 
taken as a sign that there is no culture for such behaviour.  
It thus appears that although neither system perfectly embodies either definition, they both 
lean more towards being systems of consensus than competition. 
5.3.2 The role of veto points and players 
Veto points are points of the process at which the consent of a particular person or group is 
necessary in order for the process to move forward. Veto players are groups or institutions that 
have the power to stop or delay a process (Jochem 2003:4-13). Steiner et al. (Steiner et al. 
2004:82-84) identify these as a particular institutional arrangements that promote deliberation. 
According to Steiner (2004:82), such arrangements are always present in consensus democracies. 
Internally, both parliaments seem to have few, rather weak formal veto points and no strong 
veto players.  
Outside the parliaments themselves, it is possible to look at the university institutions 
themselves as very strong veto points affecting student parliament politics. The parliaments 
themselves have very little formal power, and all suggestions and issues pertaining to university 
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matters must pass through the university system before they can hope to be converted into actual 
action. Because of this, the various actors in the university, most notably the university boards 
and rectors could be interpreted as veto players in relation to the student parliaments. Having 
such strong veto players outside the influence of the parliaments would therefore be conducive to 
deliberativeness according to Steiner et al.  
5.3.3 Second chamber debate 
Steiner et al. (2004:86-7) also found that second chambers of parliaments were generally 
more deliberative than first chambers. Stronger norms of civility, smaller chambers, longer terms 
and generally older and more experienced members were factors considered to contribute to this. 
Neither of our two parliaments have a bicameral system. Their executive committees could 
be said to embody some of the features of a second chamber, but they do not fill the role as a 
second round of debate, rather they generally debate issues and make a recommendation before 
debate in the parliament proper. Therefore, this antecedent cannot be seen as present in either of 
our democracies. 
5.3.4 The publicity of arenas 
With reference to Jon Elster (1998a), Steiner et al. (Steiner et al. 2004:87-8,128-31) also 
found that closed debates were more deliberative than open debates. Elster in particular highlight 
that there are two mechanisms at work here: public debates may induce a tendency to “play for 
the gallery” where the participants work to highlight their arguments (and undermine those of 
their opponents) for the audience rather than to reach good conclusions. On the other hand, 
public debates may allow less bargaining and more thorough argumentation, as the public might 
expect decisions to be made on a rational basis rather than through political machinations. There 
seems to be much debate on this issue, both among empirists and theorists, with considerable 
nuance to it, but those clearly labelling themselves as deliberative theorists appear to be leaning 
in the direction of closed deliberation, and Steiner et al. find that closed arenas seem to have a 
positive effect on deliberation (Bohman 1999; Chambers 2004; Goodin 1996:341; Meade and 
Stasavage 2008; Naurin 2008; Rawls 1997). 
Both parliaments conduct their debates in formally open meetings, where everybody has 
access. At one occasion, there was even an attempt made to stream the meeting on the internet. 
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Despite this, the actual result of this openness appears to be rather scarce. In no case were there 
more than 10 persons present at the meeting beyond those with a formal role in the proceedings. 
Both universities have active student newspapers, but these rarely seem to report from the actual 
proceedings of the parliaments. The newspaper Universitas in Oslo seems to report on divisions 
in the parliament more often than its counterpart Under Dusken in Trondheim, where such 
reports seem nearly non-existent. I do however find it more likely that this is an endogenous 
factor to the system, due to the formalized factions that make divisions easier to identify in Oslo 
In any case it appears to contribute very little to the actual publicity of the proceedings.  
Nevertheless this is something that could bear closer examination. In future research, one 
could for example do a review of articles in the two papers or conduct interviews with editors. 
Although both parliaments hold open meetings, there is a difference in who is given speaking 
rights. According to the Rules of Proceeding of the Student Parliament in Oslo 
(Studentparlamentet i Oslo 1993:§3), only holders of office in the Student Parliament or a related 
position has the right to speak and make proposals to the parliament. At NTNU, according to the 
parliament regulations (Studenttinget NTNU 2008:§3-6) the right to speak is open to everyone, 
and all NTNU students have the right to make proposals. This is an institutional factor that can 
be seen to have consequences for deliberation in the parliaments. On the other hand, these 
regulations are not set in stone, and they are frequently amended and changed by the parliaments 
themselves. This happens with such a frequency that I find it reasonable to treat them as 
endogenous to the political process. Instead of being exogenous constraints on deliberation, I 
rather find them to be a result of the emphasis each parliament puts on deliberation. 
5.3.5 Conclusions on Steiner’s antecedents 
From the discussion in this chapter, there seems to be little in the antecedents that Steiner et 
al. found to be significant that dictates that either of our two parliaments should be more 
deliberative than the other. They both seem closer to consensus than competitive democracy with 
a similar degree of publicity, without veto-points or second chambers. The first and second 
antecedents should count in favour of deliberation with the two latter against. Still, they account 
for little difference between the two. 
5.3.6 Introducing formalized factions as an antecedent 
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With little difference identified according to Steiner’s antecedents, we can turn to examine 
what actually is different between the two, the presence of formalized factions. In the student 
parliament in Oslo, there is an elaborate system of political factions that to some degree mimic 
that of the party system in the Norwegian parliament. In Trondheim, there is no system of 
political list elections, and particularly in later years, there has been a culture of disregarding 
political and ideological affiliations. With reference to the theory discussion in chapter 3, I 
introduce this as a new antecedent. My hypothesis is that a democratic body with an established 
system of formalized factions will be less likely to be deliberative than a body with no such 
system. 
It is not surprising that Steiner et al. did not include this as an antecedent in their research. 
They were focused on national parliaments, and with the exception of a few Pacific island states 
(Rosenblum 2008:468), we have no examples of national parliaments without a system of 
organized factions. Contemporary political science tends to consider these inseparable from 
democracy.  
With the modern day pluralist dimension of democracy, other forms of democracy become 
increasingly relevant in society. Many organizations in civil society have a significant impact on 
democratic processes. These display a large range of different forms of organization, to a large 
degree various forms of democracy. Few of these operate along the same lines of formalized 
division that national democracy does. Regardless of whether we can achieve national 
democracy without factions, it should be interesting for political scientists to learn more about 
what effect factions have on democracy and the dynamics of democracy without them. 
Furthermore, if we expand the analysis of deliberation to include a larger variety of debate 
settings, we should be able to gain more insight into institutional characteristics that promote and 
hinder deliberation. Drawing upon such insights ought to be of interest to political scientists 
interested in deliberation and how it influences or may influence democracy. 
As shown in chapter 3, there is reason to believe that factions may have a detrimental effect 
on deliberation in political bodies. I also expect that sufficient empirical investigation will show 
this effect to be prevalent in different styles of democratic organizations today. If so, it may not 
be reason to discard factionalism in democracy, but it may be reason to take another look at how 
we want parties to operate in democratic processes. 
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As mentioned earlier, the main difference between these two parliaments is the presence or 
absence of formal political factions. The student parliament at UiO practices a system of list 
elections. Registering a list is open for all students, and requires only that a sufficient number of 
eligible candidates are registered on the list. The faction behind each list presents a common 
political platform, and generally has a spokesperson or leader in charge of negotiation with other 
factions over positions and other issues. During the year, the factions usually hold faction 
meetings between the meetings in the parliament in which they discuss and find a common 
position on the topics at hand. 
The lists with the longest traditions, and the strongest tradition for unitary behaviour, are the 
ones tied to political parties or ideologies. There is a Social Democratic faction tied to the 
Labour party, a Blue list tied to the conservative party Høyre, a green list, left alliance, liberal 
list, moderate list and so forth.  The second group of lists is the so called faculty lists. This is a 
somewhat newer phenomenon, with its origins in the recently abolished system with faculties as 
electoral districts. These include factions such as the Realistlista (the Sciences list), SV-lista (the 
social sciences list), Juristlista (the law list) and so forth. These are lists not directly tied to 
ideologies or parties, but to the electorates they draw upon. Lastly, one candidate from each 
faculty is elected by ballot to act as the faculty representative of that faculty, often a member of 
the local faculty student body. The composition of these groups is as follows: 
Table 2: List representation at UiO 
Faculty lists 10 repr. 
Ideology/party lists 18 repr. 
Faculty representatives 16 repr. 
Total 34 repr. 
(Studentparlamentet i Oslo 2009) 
We can see that a little over half the representatives are elected from the traditional party or 
ideology lists, while the other half are tied to faculty representation. According to my own 
experience and my impression of general discussion, the representation of the faculty lists is 
unusually high in the session that has been studied here, compared to previous sessions. In the 
session after, however, the number of faculty list representatives had increased to 13, possibly 
signifying a more long term shift away from ideologically motivated elections.  
64 
 
In the NTNU parliament, there is no formal recognition of political factions. Rather than 
elections by political lists, each candidate runs independently on his or her own platform, with 
the faculties as electoral districts. There are multiple mandates per faculty, distributed according 
to the number of students. Although candidates occasionally flag their ideological preferences in 
the elections, at least since the late 1990s, this has generally not been a major point for most 
members, and most tend not to disclose this. No formal procedures give any kind of recognition 
of factions within the parliament, and there is a general tendency to frown upon factionalism. 
Whether or not more informal political networks exist is hard to establish, but I have no 
indication that such is widespread. 
If the theory is correct, we can on this basis expect the student parliament at UiO to be less 
deliberative than the student parliament at NTNU. 
5.4 Results 
The general impression from the debates is that the similarity in debate climate between the 
two parliaments is much greater than the impression I have from personal experience a few years 
earlier. This view also appears to be supported by the fact that there is no significant difference 
between DQI-4 for the two parliaments. Observations were, however, limited to two separate 
meetings in each parliament within the same election period. It seems reasonable to expect a high 
correlation of deliberativeness between speeches within the same debate, as speakers tend to be 
influenced by the current climate of debate. Therefore such a narrow data base must be 
considered insufficient for drawing clear conclusions. 
Regarding the method, practical testing gives several new insights into its applicability for 
analyzing debate. The coding instructions would require further specification and some revision 
if they are to be considered generally applicable to all kinds of structured debate. The test study 
also further highlights some of the methodical reservations made in chapter 4.2.4, as well as 
raising some questions about new factors not captured by the method.   
Taking a quick look at the non-parametric correlations8 shows that there is no significant 
difference between the DQI-4 score for the parliaments. The correlation between parliament and 
all the various components is also very weak. The only correlation that is statistically significant 
                                                 
8
 Treating the parameters as being nominal (which parliament) and ordinal (the various scores), means we 
cannot analyze “normal” correlations with Pearson’s test. Instead, the data must be analyzed non-parametrically, 
using the Spearman’s rho method (Eikemo and Clausen 2007:53-4; Ringdal 2001:288-9). 
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on the 0.95 level is the content of justification indicator, with a slight improvement at NTNU 
over UiO. The closer the correlation comes to +/- 1, the more closely linked the two parameters 
would be. In this case, a correlation of -0.154, relatively close to 0 shows a rather weak link.   
According to the current data, it is in other words only slightly more likely that a debate at 
NTNU is conducted with justifications more acceptable within a deliberative framework than at 
UiO. There is no difference in expectations of deliberative behaviour between the parliaments on 
the other components. 
Table 3: Nonparametric correlation (Spearman’s rho) between parliament and DQI 
components 
 
Correlation9 Significance N 
Level of argumentation  ,073 ,304 201 
Content of Justification  -,154(*) ,030 200 
Respect -,122 ,076 214 
Constructive politics -,033 ,629 217 
DQI 4 score -,053 ,456 199 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 (Positive correlations indicate higher levels at UiO; negative correlations indicate higher 
levels at NTNU.) 
5.4.1 Relevance of speeches 
Speeches were coded along to Steiner et al.’s relevance criterion, modified as described in 
section 5.2.3.1, giving the following number of relevant speeches per debate: 
Table 4: Number of relevant speeches 
 Debate 
Relevant 
speeches 
NTNU Assessment 83 
NTNU Budget 50 
UiO Extra-faculty activity 13 
UiO Spring of possibilities 18 
UiO Rector election 16 
UiO Statutes 19 
 
Experiences with the selection of relevant speeches further confirmed the suspicion that the 
DQI method is specifically designed for a parliamentary practice where each participant makes 
                                                 
9
 Correlation between the parliament in which the debate was conducted and the various components. NTNU 
was dummy coded 0, UiO dummy coded 1, so a negative correlation score shows a higher score at NTNU and vice 
versa. 
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only a single, or very few, speeches, trying to capture the entirety of the debate with each speech 
act. In both the parliaments analyzed here, the norm is to make rather short speeches, including 
only one or a limited number of arguments in each speech. There is a lot of variation between 
speakers as to whether or not they repeat their demand(s) with each speech. This makes it 
necessary to also take supportive arguments into account where it seems clear that these are part 
of an argument with demands that follow implicitly from statements in previous speeches. 
5.4.2 Participation 
Not a single instance of interruption of speakers as measured in the DQI (Steiner et al. 
2004:171) was observed during the studied debates. This seems to indicate that both parliaments 
have near-perfect conditions for participation, according to Steiner’s definition. This underscores 
the relevance of the question of whether the participation indicator is inadequate in capturing this 
theoretically important aspect. Steiner et al. also exclude this criterion frequently, as breaches are 
too rare to make a difference (Steiner et al. 2004:62,148). This appears to indicate that the 
current operationalization of the participation criterion is not very relevant. 
A negative definition of participation, whereby the level of participation is defined by the 
lack of visible obstacles to participation might be replaced or supplemented by a positive one, in 
which actual participation is measured. Level of participation, measured as the proportion of 
representatives actually presenting speeches, could be one way of capturing participation. 
Another could be measuring the level of attendance, in which proportion of members in 
attendance is measured.  
If deliberation was considered a good way to affect the outcome, you would expect more 
participants to try and make a difference in the debate. Not contributing to the debate, sharing no 
information at all, must also be considered just about the least deliberative behaviour possible. 
Even presenting deliberately misleading information may provide other participants with further 
insight. The only instance in which non-participation could be considered good deliberative 
practice would be if the speaker genuinely had nothing to contribute to the debate, and 
participation would only be irrelevant or confusing even to one’s own understanding of the issue. 
If it was a general trend that representatives were so unable, it would appear that the election 
process had failed at producing representatives at all suitable for the job of conducting 
deliberation.  
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Table 5: Debate attendance 
Debate 
Relevant 
speeches 
#  of 
speakers
10
 
Attending 
members 
Total 
members11 
NTNU Assessment 83 24 24 27 
NTNU Budget 50 13 21 27 
UiO Extra-faculty activity 13 5 23 32 
UiO Spring of possibilities 18 10 19 31 
UiO Rector election 16 8 19 31 
UiO Statutes 19 8 23 32 
 
As seen by the table above, in the debates covered here, there were differences both in the 
level of attendance and the number who contributed to the debate. Two meetings in each body is 
of course too little to identify a general trend, but an overview of the total level of attendance for 
the entire period  for each parliament shows that the level was 65 % at UiO and 85 % at 
NTNU12. No record of the number of speakers exists, so this can only be taken as an indication 
that there might potentially be an environment with lower participation at UiO, despite the fact 
that both parliaments have perfect participation according to the DQI criteria. 
It would appear that an ideal method should have a better measure for participation than the 
current DQI indicator. Looking at the total number of speakers as compared to the potential 
number of speakers in a debate could be one way to do this. That would require analysis at the 
debate level rather than at the speech act level that forms the basis for the DQI. 
5.4.3 Level of justification 
There were no statistically significant differences in level of justification between 
parliaments or debates. 
I have already commented on the problems presented by the level of justification factor. The 
debates characterized by a large number of short speeches appear to be captured very poorly by 
this way of coding. It is generally very difficult to present sophisticated justifications in 1 
                                                 
10
 Also including non-members participating in the debate at NTNU. Non-members are generally barred from 
speaking at UiO, see section 5.3.4. 
11
 Both attending and total including executive committees, excluding seats not elected. 
12
 According to official records from both parliaments, counted by number of members with voting rights 
present at opening roll call for each meeting, compared with the total number of potential members. Representative 
slots that were not filled were not deducted, as the times of election was not known. These might have caused minor 
variations in the numbers. 
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minute, but with recurring speeches one can still explore several justifications for a single 
proposal.  
For example in the NTNU debate over a two-assessor system for exams, one particular 
speaker made 7 separate relevant speeches. Over the course of those 7 speeches, the speaker 
presented at least 4 separate arguments13 for the measure in question, but only a single argument 
in any one speech. Each argument was addressed by the opposition in turn. As a result, this was 
coded as 7 instances of inferior (1) or qualified (2) justification. Opposition refutations of the 
arguments were similarly presented one at a time. If these arguments had been presented in a 
single speech, with the subsequent need for the opposition to address them with several 
arguments in one speech, they might instead have been coded as a few instances of sophisticated 
(3) justification, in turn increasing the average DQI score of the debate. 
This is a challenge that the pragma-dialectical method (presented in section 4.2.3) in 
particular was focused on addressing. This solution is however problematic, as reorganization of 
arguments, combining and adding implicit arguments makes the whole process very little 
transparent and difficult to replicate. A possible middle ground that could work in practice would 
be to treat all speeches made by a single speaker regarding the same demand as one single 
speech, analyzing all presented arguments as a whole, according to the DQI criteria, without 
actually changing their structure and adding “missing” parts. As with the potential fix for the 
issue with the participation indicator mentioned in the previous section, this would also require 
analyzing the debate at a level above individual speech acts, and would also require more 
personal discretion on the part of the coder, potentially strengthening validity at the cost of 
reliability.  
5.4.4 Content of justification 
As seen in Table 3 (on page 65), content of justification indicator is the only DQI indicator 
with a statistically significant difference between the parliaments. In the parliament at NTNU, 
there appears to be a slightly higher level of content of justification than in the parliament at 
                                                 
13
 Speaker number 4 presented arguments in speeches no. 5, 23, 25, 37, 56, 85 and 87 of the debate on exam 
assessment system. Separate arguments were made regarding the likelihood of improving the exactness of grading, 
the measure as improving the overall quality assurance system, the relative cost of the measure and the prevention of 
personal relation bias in assessment of exams. 
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UiO. This means that at NTNU, as we can see from the table below, this is the result of more 
explicit references to the common good in the NTNU parliament (code 2), than at UiO. 
 
Table 6: Frequency crosstab - Content of justification vs. parliament 
   Content of Justification Total 
   0 1 2  
NTNU Count 7 109 16 132 
  % within 
Parliament 5,3% 82,6% 12,1% 100,0% 
UiO Count 6 60 2 68 
  % within 
Parliament 8,8% 88,2% 2,9% 100,0% 
  Linear-by-linear Chi Sq. association test: p = 0.031 
 
This aspect might be particularly interesting also for qualitative analysis. The nature of the 
group interest references made could possibly tell us more about the causality behind any 
quantitative difference. Taking a quick look at the actual group interest statements made in the 
two parliaments show that the examples found at NTNU mostly refer to the apparent division 
between the students of different faculties, particularly between students of technical sciences on 
the one hand and the social sciences and humanities on the other. This is clear, for example in 
this statement from an engineering science student in the NTNU debate over the assessment 
system at exams: 
[…]We should be serious about this and actually make priorities, and there are many things I find more 
important than having two assessors, especially for the engineering science students. Among them I think 
there are quite a few that think other things are more important. (NTNU debate on the assessor system, 
speech act #77) 
Finding traces of this division was very much expected. Tensions have at times been high 
between the engineering science student council(s) and other student bodies in the university. 
Even though the current student councils of the technical sciences have no direct representation 
in the student parliament, and thus don’t constitute an organized faction, it appears reasonable to 
suspect that some of the antipathies of other arenas also appear in the student parliament.  
Perhaps more interesting was the lack of partisan statements in the formally factionalised 
parliament in Oslo. Only 6 speeches were clearly catering to group or constituency interest, 
coded as (0) on the content of justification scale. Of those 6 instances, none explicitly mentioned 
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partisan groupings. They either referred to pure personal interest, the interest of a particular 
constituency group or other special interest group in the university.  
This may just be just coincidence on account of too little data, for example that these debates 
by coincidence were on issues with a lower than usual level of partisan polarization. It may also, 
however, be a sign that former partisan divisions have weakened and that the real difference both 
in partisanship and deliberative attitude between the two parliaments is now weak or non-
existent. In any case, he current data gives no clear support to the claim that partisanship affects 
the content of justification in the Student Parliament of Oslo. More data is needed to make clear 
conclusions on this issue. 
5.4.5 Respect 
Two out of the four respect indicators do at first glance appear to show significant 
differences between the parliaments. The NTNU parliament both had fewer instances of explicit 
disrespect and more instances of explicit respect towards the demands of others. This supports 
the impression gained from qualitative analysis of the data, where the UiO debates appear to 
have a tendency to more harsh language, using terms like “ridiculous” or “silly” about proposals 
in a debate. The numbers in either direction are small however, so it appears to be hasty to draw 
very clear conclusions on the basis of these numbers.  
The instances of disrespect at UiO were not clearly partisan in content; they were rarely 
made with reference to political faction. Nevertheless, there were no instances of disrespect 
towards members of one’s own group. Although the number of disrespectful comments in 
general was low, a qualitative assessment seems to indicate they were reserved for members of 
other factions. They were usually characterizations along the lines of: “I think it’s a bit silly to 
claim that [...]” (debate 23, speech #8) or “[This suggestion] can only be described as incredibly 
bad” (debate 24, speech #5).  
If we look at the numbers for the respect indicators, we see that for only two indicators is 
there an apparently significant correlation. Treating the categories as ordinal indicators, this can 
be found with Spearman’s rho non-parametric correlation (Eikemo and Clausen 2007:53-4; 
Ringdal 2001:288-9). Both the respect towards group and respect towards demand indicators 
have a p-value of less than 0.05, indicating that it is likely that there is a real correlation between 
the parliament in which the debate was held and the level of respect. 
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However, the real numbers behind the correlation on the respect towards group indicator 
seem particularly weak. With only 5 speeches deviating from the neutral statement, I find it hard 
to accept this as a significant correlation. With only one coder, we cannot assume the coding to 
be exact enough to make conclusions from so few instances. On the respect towards demand 
indicator, support for the correlation is based on a few more deviations from the neutral 
statement, but still too few to give much confidence in the reliability.  
 
Table 7: Nonparametric correlation (Spearman’s rho) between parliament and respect 
indicators   
 
Code14 Correlation15 Sign. N 0 1 2 
Toward group NTNU 1 132 0 ,198 (**) 0,004 214 UiO 0 62 4 
Toward demand NTNU 5 115 13 -,235(**) 0,001 215 UiO 10 55 1 
Toward counterarg. NTNU 11 79 8 -,094 0,226 167 UiO 9 47 3 
By reference NTNU 1 127 5 -,036 0,602 214 UiO 0 65 1 
Aggregate respect  -,122 0,076 214 
(**) Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
 
When we aggregate by adding the respect indicators together, there is still not a significant 
correlation on the 0.05 level. In addition, the methodical concerns about such aggregation are 
also still relevant. The separate indicators can at best be considered as an ordinal scale. The 
simple addition of ordinal values together still seems somewhat dubious. 
5.4.6 Constructive politics 
As noted in section 5.2.3.6, the constructive politics indicator was perhaps the most 
challenging indicator to code and analyze. Most of the debates included a number of proposals, 
but rarely were they framed in the form of ideal positions and mediating proposals. Many 
                                                 
14
 The codes used, according to the coding instructions discussed in section 5.2.3, standardized on a 0-2 scale 
where 1 is for an explicitly disrespectful statement, 1 is a neutral statement and 2 is an explicitly respectful 
statement. 
15
 Correlation between the parliament in which the debate was conducted and the various components. NTNU 
was dummy coded 0, UiO dummy coded 1, so a negative correlation score shows a higher score at NTNU and vice 
versa. 
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proposals are also just minor reformulation of existing demands to improve the wording. It was 
therefore difficult at times to discern what constituted a different position, what constituted a 
mediating proposal and what was in reality the same proposal. 
I also felt the need to introduce a new code to this parameter, reserved for the instances 
where a speaker explicitly admits to change to the position of the former opposition in the 
debate. Provided that this is the result of yielding to the better argument and not the result of 
coercion, such behaviour must by deliberation’s very definition be considered a good indicator of 
deliberative debate. The code should not be used if one were to explicitly make a statement that 
signalled the intent to accept the proposal when making it clear that this was out of strategic 
concerns or coercion, although I would consider it unlikely that such statements would be made 
explicit in plenary debate. 
5.4.7 Deliberative quality index 
As we could expect from the lack of significant differences according to the individual 
factors, there is also no significant difference between the two parliaments’ performance on the 
total DQI index. Using Steiner et al.’s DQI-4 index, the difference between the average score 
between parliaments is far from being statistically significant: 
 
Table 8: DQI-4 comparison 
 UiO NTNU Total 
Mean DQI-4 9.92 10.24 10.12 
Standard deviation 2.09 2.13 2.12 
Spearman’s Rho correlation16  -0,053 
Correlation significance  0,456 
 
As I will discuss further in the next chapter, this may be because the original thesis is wrong, 
that the institutional factions at the UiO do not have significant influence on the deliberative 
environment. On the other hand, the number of speeches analyzed, the number of representatives 
included and the spread over time periods may be too small to make the analysis sufficiently 
robust. More data will be needed to be able to conclusively discredit the theory.  
                                                 
16
 Correlation between the parliament in which the debate was conducted and the DQI score. NTNU was 
dummy coded 0, UiO dummy coded 1, so a negative correlation shows a higher DQI score at NTNU. 
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6 Conclusions 
There seems ample theoretical basis to support a theory that institutionalization of political 
factions through political parties has an effect on deliberation. To understand this phenomenon 
and to gain more insight into how democracy works, this should be a topic for further research. 
6.1 Why were there not significant differences in discourse quality 
between the parliaments? 
This study clearly offers no empirical evidence to prove that political factions have a 
deteriorating effect on deliberation. The simplest explanation for this would be that the 
hypothesis is wrong: there may simply be no such connection. Alternatively, it might be the case 
that the method is not suitable for studying the phenomenon. I believe both these conclusions are 
too hasty, and offer three reasons that might explain the lack of significant difference, even if the 
hypothesis is correct. 
Firstly, the number of speech acts studied is probably too low. The conclusions drawn by 
Steiner et al. (Steiner et al. 2004) about the antecedents of deliberation are in most cases based 
on more than 1,000 cases – over 5 times the valid number of cases in this analysis. 
Secondly, we might expect a strong variation between parliament sessions. These are 
relatively small groups of people that interact closely over the course of a year. Personal relations 
might affect and modify the institutional factors in either direction within a single session. This 
might (by coincidence) have been a year in which personal relations created different conditions 
for deliberation than what has been the case over (for example) a five-year period. To get certain 
information about general trends one should therefore analyze the discourse in the parliament 
over several years. 
Thirdly, the electorate’s preference for partisan politics might be at a low, resulting in 
relatively poor election results for the factions most strongly related to political parties. At UiO, 
the so called “faculty lists” made a good election in the year before this study, so the number of 
declared “partisan” representatives was relatively low. This is another coincidence that might 
have affected the outcome of the analysis. 
To finally be able to discredit the thesis or theory it would therefore be necessary to increase 
both the amount of data and the spread over time. Hopefully, the exposition of the method done 
here, and the preliminary data, may serve as the starting point for such a study. 
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6.2 Conclusion on using the DQI method for the study of deliberation 
The ideal method for analyzing deliberation should have both the theoretical completeness of 
qualitative methods and the analytical rigor of quantitative methods. Comparing several methods 
employed for the purpose indicates that the Discourse Quality Index appears to be the method 
that comes closest to achieving this. There are however a number of reservations that should be 
dealt with. 
Regarding theoretical completeness, the method does – by the authors’ own admission –
completely omit the truthfulness criterion of deliberative theory, not taking into regard whether 
or not participants are actually truthful when they participate in debates. It is possible that this 
really is impossible or nearly so to measure. The inadequate measure of participation is a larger 
concern that seems to have been treated much too lightly in the work of Steiner et al.  
Methodically there are several more concerns. Perhaps most important is the way the index is 
composed. The summation of ordinal values to become a continuous scale seems dubious. At the 
very least, further justification is needed for why this is acceptable. Furthermore, the reductionist 
style of analysis, treating each speech act separately seems to create some problems, particularly 
in debates characterized by shorter, more frequent speeches. A solution to this problem might be 
to consider all speeches by a single speaker in a single debate as one. A more holistic approach 
to debates could also make it easier to find ways to measure participation, for example through 
considering the proportion of participants actually making speeches. This might however mean 
that one would strengthen validity by possibly sacrificing some of the reliability of the measures. 
Despite these weaknesses, the basic approach taken by Steiner et al. appears to be the most 
promising way of moving forward into this field of research. A refined version of the method 
might be applicable both to analyze possible antecedents to good deliberation, but also to study 
the effects deliberation has on outcomes.  
Adding further data, through following the two student parliaments examined in this thesis 
over time, may give more answers than I am able to provide here. Furthermore, with sufficient 
resources a broader strategy could be applied. By examining different venues for deliberation, 
for example within the civic and political spheres in a congruence case study, more thorough 
insight into both this and other antecedents could be derived. Both at the Bern Center for 
Interdisciplinary Deliberation Studies and at Senter for kommunalforskning at the University of 
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Tromsø (Bern Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of Deliberation 2007a; Jenssen 1996:92-3), 
such collections of data are already being built.  
Such studies about different factors that influence deliberation could give grounds for more 
sophisticated analyses, showing not only causal connections, but also reaching conclusions about 
their relative importance.  
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